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Unusual: The Death Penalty for Inadvertent Killing 
GUYORA BINDER, BRENNER FISSELL & ROBERT WEISBERG* 
 
Can a burglar who frightens the occupant of a house, causing a fatal heart attack, 
be executed? More generally, does the Eighth Amendment permit capital punishment 
of one who causes death inadvertently? This scenario is possible in the significant 
minority of American jurisdictions that permit capital punishment for felony murder 
without requiring a mental state of intent to kill or reckless indifference to human 
life. Thus far, Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence has required a culpa-
ble mental state of recklessness for execution of accomplices in a fatal felony, but 
has not yet addressed the culpability required for execution of the actual killer. In 
this Article, we urge the recognition of a new Eighth Amendment norm against exe-
cuting even actual killers who lack a culpable mental state of at least recklessness, 
with respect to the victim’s death. Using the methods employed by the Supreme Court 
for determining “evolving standards of decency,” we survey the pertinent homicide 
and sentencing laws of the fifty-three criminal law jurisdictions in the United States. 
Second, we evaluate the facts of the cases that resulted in the nearly five hundred 
executions that have taken place since 1973, when the post-Furman statutes became 
operative, and 2016, in those jurisdictions permitting execution for inadvertent kill-
ing. We did the same for the facts of the 1755 cases of all death row inmates convicted 
in those jurisdictions and alive at the time of the study (2016). This analysis shows 
that capital punishment for inadvertent killing has become “truly unusual,” and 
therefore, unconstitutional.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 * Guyora Binder is a SUNY Distinguished Professor and Hodgson Russ Scholar at the 
University at Buffalo Law School; Brenner Fissell is an Associate Professor of Law at Hofstra 
University from September 2018; Robert Weisberg is the Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor 
of Law at Stanford Law School. Thanks are owed to research assistants Caroline Cohn, Sarah 
Gilmartin, Raphael Ginsburg, Katherine Guthrie, Savannah Haynes, David Oyer, Clare Riva, 
Daphna Spivack, Alex Treiger, and Abigail Xu, working under the leadership of Sophia 
Whiting at Stanford; and Kristian Klepes, Alyssa Bergsten, Jessica Gill, Ian Edelstein-
Herrmann, and Griffin Dault at Buffalo. We are also grateful to Nina Rivkind, for encouraging 
our interest in this issue. 
550 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:549 
 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 550 
I. THE PROBLEM: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR UNINTENTIONAL FELONY MURDER 553 
II. DETERMINING A NEW STANDARD OF DECENCY ............................................... 556 
A. COMPARATIVE VS. CATEGORICAL REVIEW OF SENTENCES .................... 556 
1. OBJECTIVE INDICIA .......................................................................... 558 
2. INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT—PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT AND 
CULPABILITY .................................................................................. 560 
III. OBJECTIVE INDICIA REGARDING INADVERTENT KILLINGS ............................. 562 
A. LEGISLATION ........................................................................................... 562 
B. STATE PRACTICE ...................................................................................... 564 
1. METHOD—FOCUS PRIMARILY ON EXECUTIONS .............................. 564 
2. THE EXECUTION DATA ..................................................................... 568 
3. SENTENCING DATA .......................................................................... 576 
i. WEAPONLESS BEATINGS & SEXUAL PENETRATION ................ 579 
ii. FIRE AND FIREARMS .............................................................. 584 
iii. ANALYSIS ............................................................................. 587 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 588 
APPENDIX A: FELONY MURDER EXECUTIONS ........................................................ 589 
SHOOTING ..................................................................................................... 589 
BLADE ........................................................................................................... 592 
BLUDGEONING .............................................................................................. 593 
STRANGLING ................................................................................................. 594 
OTHER ........................................................................................................... 595 
SUFFOCATION ................................................................................................ 595 
WEAPONLESS BEATINGS ............................................................................... 595 
APPENDIX B: FELONY MURDER DEATH SENTENCES .............................................. 596 
SHOOTINGS ................................................................................................... 596 
BLADED WEAPONS ....................................................................................... 604 
STRANGULATIONS ......................................................................................... 608 
BLUDGEONINGS ............................................................................................ 611 
BURNING ....................................................................................................... 613 
BOUND AND ABANDONED ............................................................................. 614 
INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION ......................................................................... 614 
SUFFOCATION ................................................................................................ 614 
DROWNING .................................................................................................... 614 
VEHICLE ........................................................................................................ 615 
WEAPONLESS BEATINGS & SEXUAL PENETRATION ...................................... 615 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We usually think of murder as unlawful, intentional killing. Lawyers and law stu-
dents know, however, that in most American jurisdictions, one can also commit mur-
der by participating in certain felonies during which a victim is killed—whether or 
not one intends that the victim die, and whether or not one causes the death. This is 
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the so-called felony murder doctrine. A consequence of being a “murderer,” though, 
even of the “felony murder” variety, can be capital punishment.1  
Because the felony murder doctrine extends liability for murder beyond the per-
son who directly causes death, the Supreme Court has placed limitations on execu-
tion for felony murder. In Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona, the Court deter-
mined that accomplices to felony murder cannot be executed without proof of a 
culpable mental state of intent to kill, or of reckless indifference to life.2 The Court 
has not, however, stipulated that any baseline mental state is required for the actual 
killer. The Court has probably not needed to do so because the circumstances of most 
killings evidence intent to kill or reckless indifference to human life. According to 
the FBI, the vast majority of homicides are committed by shooting the victim with a 
firearm;3 in these cases, the use of a deadly weapon against the victim shows a will-
ingness to kill and—together with other circumstances—may show a purpose of 
doing so. 
But this is not always the case. One can kill a person inadvertently—without 
awareness that one is imposing a danger of death. If this happens during a felony, the 
inadvertent killer may be liable for felony murder. In one remarkable dissenting opin-
ion, a justice on the California Supreme Court catalogued some of the arguably ab-
surd applications of the felony murder doctrine: 
(a) A burglar startles a resident, who dies of a heart attack. (Cf. People 
v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598.) 
(b) A robber inflicts only a minor injury, but the victim dies weeks later 
of unexpected medical complications. 
(c) While defendant is on the way to committing an armed robbery, his 
gun fires accidentally, killing his accomplice. (Cf. People v. Johnson 
(1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 653, 104 Cal.Rptr. 807.) 
(d) While defendant is driving the get-away car, he causes an accident, 
killing a bystander. (Cf. People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 150 
Cal.Rptr. 515.).4 
How the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence from Enmund and Tison 
would apply to these defendants—inadvertent actual killers—is unsettled. 
                                                                                                             
 
 1. See GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER 183–247 (2012). In many jurisdictions, one 
can also be liable for murder—but not capital murder—by causing death with gross reckless-
ness. GUYORA BINDER, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CRIMINAL LAW 230 (2016). 
See, e.g, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1104; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5403. But see Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 507.020 (gross recklessness homicide a capital offense).  
 2. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157–58 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
801 (1982). 
 3. Expanded Homicide Data Table 11: Murder Circumstances, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015 
/tables/expanded_homicide_data_table_11_murder_circumstances_by_weapon_2015.xls 
[https://perma.cc/ZG5A-LNCX] (recording that 9616 of 13,455 homicides in 2015 involved a 
firearm). 
 4. People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1334–35 n.3 (Cal. 1987) (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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While the legal question is open, we believe the right answer is clear: the Eighth 
Amendment should not permit capital punishment for inadvertent killing. In a previ-
ous article, we argued that this conclusion followed from the deeper considerations 
that animate Eighth Amendment law—most importantly, that those declared death 
eligible should be rationally selected as the most culpable offenders from the larger 
set of murderers.5 In this Article, we make a further claim. Not only is our conclusion 
implied by earlier Supreme Court case law, it is also compelled by an abiding societal 
consensus.  
As we will show in this Article, a new standard of decency has emerged in the 
United States against capital punishment for inadvertent killing. Today, thirty-five 
years after Enmund, enough time has passed to observe how frequently legislatures 
have permitted such sentences, how often courts have imposed them, and how often 
these sentences have been executed. Relying on such analysis, this Article argues 
that such a sentence would now violate prevailing moral standards. 
The Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of “cruel and unusual punish-
ment[],”6 including punishment that, although not inherently cruel, is disproportion-
ate to an offender’s guilt. Proportionality has two dimensions—normative and de-
scriptive. Normative proportionality assesses the relationship between a given 
sentence and the justifying purposes of punishment. Descriptive proportionality as-
sesses the relationship between a given sentence and punishments imposed in similar 
cases. We might say that a normatively disproportionate sentence inflicts pointless 
suffering and in that sense is “cruel,” while a descriptively disproportionate sentence 
departs from prevailing custom and in that sense is “unusual.” The fact that a type of 
sentence is available or is applied in very few jurisdictions is evidence that it violates 
“evolving standards of decency.”7 
Having explained in our previous article why capital punishment for inadvertent 
killing is “cruel,” we now aim to demonstrate that it is also “unusual.” Using the 
Court-prescribed method for determining “objective indicia” of societal consensus, 
we first survey the fifty-three American criminal law jurisdictions8 to assess how 
legislation and case law apply to this issue. Our review determines that only a mi-
nority of these jurisdictions, eighteen, permit the imposition of a death sentence for 
inadvertent felony murder.  
After surveying legislation on the issue, we then turn to the second indicator of 
societal consensus: state practices of punishment. Here, we follow recent trends in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and count first and place most weight on the number 
of executions for inadvertent killing in the jurisdictions where this is possible, and 
not the larger set of death sentences. We believe this approach—the Court’s own—
                                                                                                             
 
 5. Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg, Capital Punishment of 
Unintentional Felony Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141 (2017); see also Steven F. Shatz, 
The Eighth Amendment, The Death Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A 
California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 756–61 (2007) (offering a similar interpretation 
of Eighth Amendment case law in support of the unconstitutionality of California’s capital 
sentencing law). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 7. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958) (plurality opinion)). 
 8. The fifty states, District of Columbia, United States, and U.S. Military. 
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reflects the realities of the American capital punishment system, where death sen-
tences remain unexecuted for decades, where the vast majority are overturned upon 
review, and where jurors, aware of these facts, “overproduce” these sentences.9 Our 
review of state practice regarding executions for inadvertent killing demonstrates that 
the practice is extremely rare. In the eighteen jurisdictions where execution of an 
inadvertent killer is legally permissible, we find a total of only five executions out of 
the 487 that have occurred since 1973 where culpability was arguably below reck-
lessness. Moreover, we find that only one jurisdiction, Oklahoma, has executed ar-
guably inadvertent killers who were sentenced within the last twenty years.  
After assessing the data on executions, we then turn to another dataset that the 
Court has treated as relevant, but less probative: death sentences of current death row 
inmates. This set corroborates the conclusion that follows from the statistics on exe-
cutions. Of the 1755 inmates on death row at the end of 2016 in the eighteen states 
that permit execution of inadvertent felony murderers, we could identify only fifteen 
sentenced for arguably inadvertent killings. 
In light of these statistics, it is clear that capital punishment for inadvertent killing 
is “truly unusual.”10 The prevalence of legislative prohibitions on these types of death 
sentences, the rarity of their imposition by sentencers, and above all, the rarity of 
their execution, comport with statistics the Court has used to justify new Eighth 
Amendment rules in past cases. Accordingly, should the Court be presented with an 
opportunity to address the question of inadvertent killing, it should recognize a new 
constitutional rule against capital punishment for this conduct. 
Part I shows how the problem of the inadvertent actual killer arises from the in-
tersection of the felony murder doctrine with the Supreme Court’s death penalty ju-
risprudence. Part II explains the prescribed method for determining a new standard 
of decency under the Eighth Amendment, including an assessment of both legislation 
and state practice. Part III employs this method, demonstrating the rarity of capital 
punishment for inadvertent killing, and showing how the rarity of this practice com-
pares to other Eighth Amendment rules recognized by the Court. 
I. THE PROBLEM: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR UNINTENTIONAL FELONY MURDER 
The current system of capital sentencing dates from 1973, because essentially all 
previous capital sentencing laws were struck down as excessively discretionary by 
the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia.11 The Court’s 1976 decision 
in Gregg v. Georgia upheld guided discretion capital sentencing laws, some passed 
                                                                                                             
 
 9. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 
(2000). 
 10. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 
(2002). 
 11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). State courts in Delaware and North Carolina held that Furman 
invalidated only discretionary jury sentencing provisions, effectively converting their capital 
sentencing laws to mandatory death sentencing provisions. State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761, 
769 (Del. 1973); State v. Waddell, 282 S.E.2d 431 (N.C. 1973). Such mandatory capital sen-
tencing laws were then struck down in 1976, see infra n.13, so no executions were carried out 
under mandatory death penalty laws and no current death row inmates were sentenced under 
those laws.  
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as early as 1973, which require a sentencing jury to weigh statutorily enumerated 
aggravating circumstances against mitigating evidence, as sufficiently justified by 
the penal purposes of retribution and deterrence.12 The Court simultaneously struck 
down mandatory capital sentencing laws, which impose execution on all defendants 
committing aggravated murder.13 Thus, modern capital sentencing requires an 
individualized assessment that the offender was especially deserving of punishment 
and the offense especially merited deterrence. This function of capital sentencing 
makes the offender’s culpability highly relevant.14 
The mental state required for capital punishment of someone who kills another 
person is currently unsettled. The Supreme Court has stated that “in determining 
whether the death penalty is excessive, there is a distinction between intentional first-
degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individual persons . 
. . on the other.”15 Yet many of those convicted of first degree murder are convicted 
not of intentional homicide, but instead of “felony murder.” Felony murder liability 
derives from intentional participation in a felony other than homicide where a victim 
of that felony is killed—whether or not the defendant was the killer.16  
Because nonkillers participating in felonies can be convicted of murder, the 
Supreme Court has sought to limit the punishment of these co-felons (it has called 
this “vicarious felony murder”).17 To this end, the Court held in the 1982 case of 
Enmund v. Florida that felony “murderers” may be executed only when they them-
selves “killed or attempted to kill,” or “intended or contemplated that life would be 
taken.”18 In 1987, the Court lowered the bar in Tison v. Arizona, requiring only “reck-
less indifference to human life” for substantial participants in the felony.19 Both 
Enmund and Tison, though, were cases involving nonkiller co-felons: Earl Enmund 
was just a getaway driver, and the Tison brothers stood idly by while watching their 
fellow gang members kill the victims.20 Perhaps because of this, the cases left am-
biguous their application to an actual killer—what mental state would he or she 
need?  
Lower courts have grappled with this question of mental state. Of those address-
ing the question, the majority have held that the actual killer need not act with any 
                                                                                                             
 
 12. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The statute upheld in Gregg was passed in 1973. GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 27.2534.1 (1972), as amended, Ga. Laws No. 74 (1973). 
 13. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976). 
 14. Binder et al., supra note 5, at 1151–56. 
 15. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008). 
 16. “A felony murder rule punishes as murder at least some instances of unintended hom-
icide in the course of attempting or perpetrating at least some felonies.” Guyora Binder, 
Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 413 (2011). In most felony murder 
jurisdictions, participants in a fatal felony are liable as accomplices in the killing if the death 
was foreseeable as a result of and sufficiently connected to the felony. In some jurisdictions, 
all participants in a foreseeably fatal felony are equally liable as principals. BINDER, supra note 
1, at 213–25. 
 17. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438. 
 18. 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
 19. 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). 
 20. Id. at 141; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784–85. 
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culpable mental state at all with respect to the victim’s death.21 Most have seen the 
question as easily answered by the language of Enmund—if one “killed,” then that 
is enough even absent intent (perhaps some thought intent was implicit in the term 
“killing”). Take, for example, the conclusion of the Tenth Circuit in Workman v. 
Mullin, where the evidence showed that the defendant caused three blunt head inju-
ries to a two-year-old child, equivalent in force to the fall from a two- or three-story 
building.22 The court answered the Enmund-Tison challenge as follows: 
Workman’s crime falls into the category of cases under Enmund in which 
a felony murderer has “actually killed” his victim. . . . The significance 
of falling into Enmund’s category of when a felony murderer has “actu-
ally killed” his victim is that the Eighth Amendment’s culpability deter-
mination for imposition of the death penalty has then been satisfied.23  
Our research has found that twelve jurisdictions agree, and six disagree.24 
We have addressed the merits of this interpretation of Enmund and Tison fully in 
our previous article, Capital Punishment of Unintentional Felony Murder.25 There, 
we argued that the required mental state for the actual killer under the controlling 
cases is not easily decided by the words in those opinions, and instead remains an 
open question.26 Moreover, we explained how failing to consider the culpable mental 
state of the perpetrator allows for a cruelly disproportionate result: the execution of 
an inadvertent actual killer.27 This result is absurd, and should be held unconstitu-
tional, because the central background principle of Eighth Amendment death penalty 
law is the rational selection of the most culpable murderers for death.28 Obviously, 
this rational selection is impossible if culpability is ignored, and by any standard in 
our jurisprudence, an inadvertent killer cannot be among the most culpable of those 
sentenced for murder. To solve this problem, we urged the Court to promulgate a 
new interpretation of Enmund and Tison that extends the requirement of recklessness 
even to actual killers.29 
In reading through the lower court cases that interpreted Enmund and Tison, we 
noticed something striking: their facts. Although many of these courts made legal 
rulings that no intent was required for an actual killer, almost none of them presented 
even a plausible case of killing without intent to kill or reckless indifference to human 
life. This pattern has led us to believe that the case for prohibiting capital punishment 
for inadvertent killings goes well beyond the logical extension of Eighth Amendment 
                                                                                                             
 
 21. See Binder et al., supra note 5, at 1181–1201 (surveying jurisdictions). 
 22. Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1104 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 23. Id. at 1111 (citing Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986), abrogated by Pope 
v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)). 
 24. See Binder et al., supra note 5, at 1201. 
 25. Binder et al., supra note 5. 
 26. Id. at 1180–81. 
 27. Id. at 1207–09. 
 28. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (“For these reasons we have ex-
plained that capital punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders who commit “a narrow 
category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability makes them “the most 
deserving of execution.”’”). 
 29. See Binder et al., supra note 5. 
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principles. Since the resumption of capital punishment permitted by the 1976 deci-
sion in Gregg v. Georgia, a societal consensus has emerged against the capital 
punishment of inadvertent killing. Thus, even if the 1982 decision in Enmund were 
correctly interpreted to permit execution for inadvertently causing death in the 
course of certain felonies, a standard of decency “evolving”30 since that time could 
now make capital punishment for this conduct unconstitutional. Indeed, we will 
argue that such a standard has evolved. 
II. DETERMINING A NEW STANDARD OF DECENCY 
The Eighth Amendment forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.”31 As 
delineated in the language of the Supreme Court’s elaboration, this prohibition has 
been interpreted to ban punishments that are “disproportionate” to the offense, with 
proportionality defined according to the punishment’s comportment with “the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”32 
Therefore, the effect of this Clause will change over time: “The standard itself 
remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society 
change.”33 The reason is that proportionality “is not merely descriptive, but 
necessarily embodies a moral judgment.”34 How, though, do courts discern whether 
a new standard of decency has emerged? While much could be said about whether 
such an assessment is possible or desirable,35 Eighth Amendment doctrine provides 
a well-established method for performing such an assessment. 
A. Comparative vs. Categorical Review of Sentences 
The determination of proportionality has differed depending on the type of sen-
tence. Challenges to term-of-years sentences have most often been assessed by 
weighing the totality of the circumstances and comparing the sentences with others 
for similar offenses in the same and other jurisdictions. By contrast, challenges to 
death sentences have been evaluated categorically.  
In the context of sentences of imprisonment, when a “particular defendant’s 
sentence” is challenged as “grossly” disproportionate, it is weighed using what we 
might call a totality of the circumstances test: the Court has said it will look at “all 
of the circumstances of the case.”36 The assessment begins by “comparing the 
gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.”37 If this threshold of  
 
                                                                                                             
 
 30. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 32. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101). 
“[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
[the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 33. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747–50 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 36. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–61 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 60. 
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disproportionality is met, the Court then engages in a comparative analysis:  
“compar[ing] the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other 
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.”38 If the intra- and interjurisdictional comparison 
“validates” the threshold conclusion of gross disproportionality, then the sentence 
is unconstitutional.39 Applying this method, the Court held in Solem v. Helm that 
the sentence of a repeat offender to life-without-parole for writing a bad check was 
disproportionate.40 Yet since Solem (1983), every similar challenge to a particular 
sentence of incarceration has failed.41 When the Court most recently invalidated a 
term-of-years sentence in Graham v. Florida, it did so using a different method: a 
“categorical approach.”42 The Court justified the different approach by concluding 
that it was evaluating not a particular sentence, but a “sentencing practice,” in this 
case imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders for nonhomicide offenses. 
The Court defined a sentencing practice as a “particular type of sentence as it 
applies to an entire class of offenders.”43 As the Court acknowledged, it borrowed 
this “categorical” approach from death penalty cases.44 
A “categorical” evaluation of a sentencing practice involves two steps: (1) 
ascertaining the empirical moral consensus of the national population, and (2) 
determining conceptually whether a sentencing practice in violation of such a 
consensus nevertheless advances accepted purposes of punishment. This is the 
Court’s most recent formulation, from Graham v. Florida: 
The Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, as 
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to determine 
whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at 
issue. Next, guided by “the standards elaborated by controlling prece-
dents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose,” the Court 
must determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment 
whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.45 
Both the objective indicia of societal consensus and the independent judgment 
of the Court must point to the same answer for a claim of disproportionality to 
prevail. 
                                                                                                             
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
 41. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (discussing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer 
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)). 
 42. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62. 
 43. Id. at 61. 
 44. Id. at 60 (“The second classification of cases has used categorical rules to define 
Eighth Amendment standards. The previous cases in this classification involved the death 
penalty.”). 
 45. Id. at 61 (citations omitted). 
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1. Objective Indicia 
The first step in the categorical approach is the empirical survey of moral view-
points in American society as evidenced by “legislative enactments” and “state prac-
tice.”46 These are called “objective indicia of society’s standards.”47 
A legislative consensus against a sentencing practice is not a sine qua non for 
finding a societal consensus rejecting such a practice. For example, in Graham, the 
court found a societal consensus against life without parole for juveniles committing 
nonhomicidal offenses even though a majority of jurisdictions permitted the prac-
tice.48 Yet, legislative enactments are “the clearest and most reliable” evidence of 
societal views.49 Legislative evidence includes state and federal statutes regarding 
who and what can be capitally punished. The number of jurisdictions that permit or 
forbid a certain result is the most relevant question. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the 
Court summarized what the threshold number for a national consensus would look 
like: 
Though our review of national consensus is not confined to tallying the 
number of States with applicable death penalty legislation, it is of signif-
icance that, in 45 jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child 
rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in Atkins and 
Roper and the 42 States in Enmund that prohibited the death penalty un-
der the circumstances those cases considered.50 
Thus, evidence that a substantial majority of jurisdictions has enacted legislation 
against an application of the death penalty (including those banning the death penalty 
entirely) may be sufficient to show legislative support for a societal consensus. The 
Court did not find a legislative consensus in Graham, for example, when it noted that 
thirty-seven states plus the United States and the District of Columbia permitted life 
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.51 Beyond the tally, the trend of 
jurisdictions towards or away from abolition is also relevant,52 and so too is the 
strength of the majorities that passed the given enactment in the jurisdiction’s legis-
lature.53 
The second, and more complicated category is that of “state practice”—how the 
legislation on the books is actually implemented. In Graham, for example, the Court 
noted that while thirty-nine of fifty-two jurisdictions permitted life without parole 
                                                                                                             
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 62. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
 51. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62 (finding consensus on grounds of state practice). 
 52. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002) (The Court noted that while only 
nineteen states banned execution of the mentally disabled, seventeen of these bans occurred 
soon after the earlier decision in Penry which had said that two states was insufficient. This 
was called the “consistency of the direction of the change.”). 
 53. Id. at 316 (“The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legisla-
tures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”). 
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for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, only eleven jurisdictions imposed such sen-
tences, and the majority of such sentences came from just one state.54  
In evaluating societal standards for capital punishment, the most essential aspect 
of state practice is the number of death sentences and executions a given state metes 
out for a given class of conduct or offender: “the sentencing decisions that juries have 
made.”55 While death sentences continue to be relevant in determining state practice, 
the trend in more recent case law is to focus on the executions that are ultimately 
carried out. In 2002, the Court in Atkins v. Virgina found that execution of the men-
tally disabled was “truly unusual” when only five states completed such executions 
in the prior thirteen years.56 Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court noted 
that only three states had executed defendants who had committed their crimes as 
juveniles in the previous ten years.57 Finally, in the 2008 case Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
the Court took note that only two death sentences for child rape had been given since 
1964, but seemed especially convinced by the fact that zero executions had occurred 
in the same time: 
Statistics about the number of executions . . . confirm our determination 
. . . that there is a social consensus against the death penalty for the crime 
of child rape. . . . [N]o individual has been executed for the rape of an 
adult or child since 1964, and no execution for any other nonhomicide 
offense has been conducted since 1963.58 
The final objective indicium, and that which carries the least weight, is the cate-
gory of nonofficial and international evidence of opinion. This includes public opin-
ion data,59 the views of respected organizations in civil society,60 and the positions 
                                                                                                             
 
 54. Graham, 560 U.S. at 64. 
 55. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794 (1982) (“Society’s rejection of the death pen-
alty for accomplice liability in felony murders is also indicated by the sentencing decisions 
that juries have made. As we have previously observed, ‘“[t]he jury . . . is a significant and 
reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.”’ (citing 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977))). See infra note 175 regarding sentences imposed 
by judges.  
 56. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (The Court did not count death sentences of the mentally dis-
abled.). 
 57. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005). 
 58. 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008). 
 59. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (“[P]olling data shows a widespread consensus 
among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing the mentally re-
tarded is wrong.”). 
 60. Id. at 316 n.21 (“For example, several organizations with germane expertise have 
adopted official positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty upon a mentally re-
tarded offender. See Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici 
Curiae; Brief for AAMR et al. as Amici Curiae. In addition, representatives of widely diverse 
religious communities in the United States, reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist 
traditions, have filed an amicus curiae brief explaining that even though their views about the 
death penalty differ, they all ‘share a conviction that the execution of persons with mental 
retardation cannot be morally justified.’ Brief for United States Catholic Conference et al. 
as Amici Curiae 2.”). 
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of foreign jurisdictions.61 This evidence has been called “not irrelevant,”62 but “by 
no means dispositive.”63 These considerations appear to function primarily as 
makeweights to buttress a conclusion already apparent from domestic, official 
sources. 
2. Independent Judgment—Purposes of Punishment and Culpability 
After the objective indicia are assessed, the Court makes its own “independent 
judgment” as to whether the sentence is disproportionate, evaluating whether the 
death penalty “serve[s] legitimate penological goals” as applied.64 The legitimate so-
cial purposes of capital punishment are retribution and deterrence.65 Retribution is 
the “expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”66 
Deterrence is the aim of reducing crime by creating the “threat of death” for its com-
mission.67 The death penalty as applied must advance these two goals, and it must do 
so in more than a tenuous or “limited” way.68 
The touchstone of whether the death penalty advances retribution and deterrence 
is culpability.69 As the Court wrote in Atkins: 
With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing that the offender gets 
his “just deserts”—the severity of the appropriate punishment neces-
sarily depends on the culpability of the offender. . . . With respect to 
deterrence—the interest in preventing capital crimes by prospective 
                                                                                                             
 
 61. Id. 316–17 n.21 (“Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the 
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved. Brief for European Union as Amicus Curiae 4.”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 796–97  n.22 (“It is thus worth noting that the doctrine of felony murder has been 
abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other 
Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.”). 
 62. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596, n.10 
(1977)). 
 63. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.21.  
 64. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010). 
 65. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (“two distinct social purposes 
served by the death penalty”). 
 66. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
 67. Id. at 185. 
 68. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (“Even if the punishment has some connection to a valid 
penological goal, it must be shown that the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in 
light of the justification offered. Here, in light of juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ 
diminished moral responsibility, any limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole 
is not enough to justify the sentence.”). 
 69. Some treat the test as bifurcated. See Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment 
Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 58 (2010); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (quoting Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005)) (“For these reasons we have explained that capital 
punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders who commit “a narrow category of the most 
serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability makes them “the most deserving of 
execution.”’”). 
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offenders—“it seems likely that ‘capital punishment can serve as a deter-
rent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.’”70 
We do not deserve punishment if we did not choose to cause or risk harm, and 
similarly, the threat of punishment cannot deter us from unwitting conduct. 
Rationally advancing the purposes of punishment requires assessing culpability, 
which in turn involves evaluating the offense and the actor’s moral responsibility 
for committing it. The Court has summarized its cases as breaking down into “two 
subsets”: “the nature of the offense” and “the characteristics of the offender.”71  
With respect to offender characteristics, the Court has held that the mentally 
disabled and the juvenile lack the necessary level of culpability. In Atkins v. 
Virginia, the Court wrote that “[m]entally retarded persons . . . by definition . . . 
have diminished [mental] capacities,” and “[t]heir deficiencies do not warrant an 
exemption from criminal sanctions, but diminish their personal culpability.”72 Two 
years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the importance of culpability was reemphasized: 
“The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well 
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite 
insufficient culpability.”73 If some feature of who you are diminishes your 
culpability sufficiently, then the Eighth Amendment bars your execution. 
The same is true if what you did evidences reduced culpability—this is the 
second subset of categories, “the nature of the offense.”74 The most important rule 
the Court has promulgated regarding this subset is that the death penalty may not 
be imposed for “instances where the victim’s life was not taken” (also called 
“nonhomicide crimes against individual persons”).75 Thus, the culpability that 
matters when looking at the nature of an offense is culpability with respect to a 
victim’s death. As the Court wrote in Kennedy v. Louisiana, “[i]n considering the 
death penalty for nonhomicide offenses this [culpability] inquiry necessarily also 
must include the question whether the death penalty balances the wrong to the 
victim.”76 In other words, one is not culpable enough for a death sentence if the 
crime he committed did not involve the “wrong” of the death of someone else. This 
was suggested in the earlier case Enmund v. Florida: “The focus must be on [the 
defendant’s] culpability . . . . [And the defendant] himself did not kill or attempt to 
kill . . . [or have] any intention of participating in or facilitating a murder.”77 
                                                                                                             
 
 70. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 71. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61 (“The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires 
consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and character-
istics . . . .”). 
 72. 536 U.S. at 318 (discussing reversal of Penry). 
 73. 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005). 
 74. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61. 
 75. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437–38 (2008). The opinion still allows crimes 
that are “offenses against the State” to be capitally punished. 
 76. Id. at 442. 
 77. 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982). 
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III. OBJECTIVE INDICIA REGARDING INADVERTENT KILLINGS 
This brings us to the contribution of this Article. The Eighth Amendment 
requires that the punished offense involve the death of a victim, and it requires 
culpability with respect to that death. But how much culpability? Can someone 
receive a death sentence for an inadvertent killing? As discussed in the first section 
and our previous Article, this outcome is legally possible in the majority of 
jurisdictions that have answered the question, but such a result undermines the 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Framing these arguments within the 
parameters laid out above, we would say that the “independent judgment” test 
weighs against capital punishment in these circumstances. Relative to the 
offender’s culpability, such punishment is cruel. In what follows, we will 
supplement these normative arguments with empirical data regarding both 
legislation and state practice. We will present an argument that the “objective 
indicia” of societal consensus indicate that capital punishment for inadvertent 
killing is “truly unusual.”78 
A. Legislation 
We begin with the “clearest and most reliable” evidence of social consensus: 
legislation in the fifty-three criminal law jurisdictions.79  
The first cut is the easiest to make. Twenty jurisdictions do not permit the death 
penalty in any case.80 According to the Court, a decision against the death penalty 
generally is also a decision against its various applications.81 Twenty jurisdictions, 
then, conclude that capital punishment for inadvertent killing is cruel and unusual, 
as they believe capital punishment is never merited. 
Next, we add in those capital jurisdictions where there is no murder liability for 
an inadvertent killing. These include one additional jurisdiction that has no felony 
murder doctrine,82 and two additional jurisdictions that require recklessness with 
respect to the victim’s death during a felony in order for the felon to be liable for 
the murder of the victim.83 
                                                                                                             
 
 78. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002). 
 79. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).  
 80. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 
9, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma 
.cc/X3WL-8MPW] (listing Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washington, D.C.). 
 81. The Court counts abolitionist states as prohibiting a specific practice for the purpose 
of determining consensus. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“When Atkins was decided, 30 States 
prohibited the death penalty for the mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had 
abandoned the death penalty altogether . . . .”). 
 82. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 2014). One state without capital 
punishment, Hawaii, also has no felony murder doctrine. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707–701 
(West 2007). 
 83. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b (2016). 
Four states without capital punishment, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, and 
Vermont, also require reckless indifference to human life for felony murder. See 9 N.M. 
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Now we turn to laws about the application of the death penalty to felony murder-
ers in capital jurisdictions. Here, three jurisdictions have imposed a baseline 
requirement of at least recklessness with respect to the killing.84 Two other 
jurisdictions require at least knowledge.85 Seven jurisdictions require intent, 
deliberation, or premeditation.86 
Altogether, then, thirty-five of the fifty-three jurisdictions have rules that 
prohibit execution of an inadvertent killer. This is a healthy majority, and shows 
legislative indicia of a societal consensus. The eighteen jurisdictions where capital 
punishment for inadvertent killing is possible are: Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and 
Wyoming.87 In fairness, this includes some very populous jurisdictions—
California and Florida, for example. Still, this is a minority of the total.  
It is important to compare these “statistics” regarding legislative consensus with 
past Supreme Court cases recognizing new Eighth Amendment rules (the Court 
itself does this).88 As the above numbers indicate, the current percentage of 
jurisdictions prohibiting execution of inadvertent killers is thirty-five of fifty-three, 
or sixty-six percent. These are the statistics of the earlier cases that have recognized 
a legislative consensus:89 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (West 2016); Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 832 (2017); 
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 319–20 (Mich. 1980); State v. Doucette, 470 A.2d 676, 
682 (Vt. 1983). 
 84. For the rule in the U.S. Military, see Loving v. Hart, 47 M.J. 438 (C.A.A.F. 1998). 
The U.S. rule is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (1994) (requiring intent to kill, intent 
to inflict serious bodily injury, contemplation that life would be taken, intent that lethal 
force be used, or reckless disregard for human life). The other jurisdiction is Alabama. See 
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 85. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (LexisNexis 
2012). 
 86. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5401 (Supp. 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2016); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (LexisNexis 2014); OR. REV. STAT.  § 163.150 (2016); 42 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 
2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2014). 
 87. Aʀɪᴢ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. Aɴɴ. § 13-751 (2010); Cᴏʟᴏ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. ANN. § 18-3-102(1) (West 
2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2007); IDAHO CODE 
§ 18-4004 (2006); Iɴᴅ. Cᴏᴅᴇ § 35-50-2-9 (2016); MISS. Cᴏᴅᴇ. Aɴɴ. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (West 
2016); Mᴏɴᴛ. Cᴏᴅᴇ. Aɴɴ. § 45-5-102(1)(b) (2016); Nᴇʙ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 28-303 (2016); Nᴇᴠ. 
Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. ANN. § 200.030(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2012); N.C. Gᴇɴ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. ANN. § 1417(A) (West 
2014); Oᴋʟᴀ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7(B) (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2015); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (West 2010); 
Wʏᴏ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. Aɴɴ. § 6-2-102 (West 2017); People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987); 
State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180 (Tenn. 2013). 
 88. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 425 (2008) (comparing “statistics” of 
child rape legislation versus that of legislation at issue in Atkins and Enmund).  
 89. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (recognizing the new rule based on state 
practice, not legislation). 
564 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:549 
 
 
Case Punishment Practice Jurisdictions Prohibiting Percentage 
Kennedy v. Louisiana,  
554 U.S. 407, 425 (2008) Offense: child rape 45/53 85% 
Roper v. Simmons,  
543 U.S. 551 (2005) Offender: juvenile <18 31/51 61% 
Atkins v. Virginia,  
536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
Offender: mentally 
disabled 30/52 58% 
Thompson v. Oklahoma,  
487 U.S. 815, 829 (1988) Offender: juvenile <16 32/51 63% 
Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) Offender: insane 53/53 100% 
Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782 (1982) 
Offense: vicarious 
felony murder 44/52 85% 
Coker v. Georgia,  
433 U.S. 584 (1977) Offense: adult rape 52/53 98% 
 
If thirty-five of fifty-three jurisdictions (sixty-six percent) prohibit execution of 
inadvertent killers, this legislation shows evidence of an emerging national 
consensus against the practice. This number fits well with the more recent cases find-
ing consensus through examination of statutes (surpassing the figures accepted in 
Atkins and Roper). 
B. State Practice 
We now turn to state practice. As the Court wrote in Kennedy, “[t]here are 
measures of consensus other than legislation. Statistics about the number of execu-
tions may inform the consideration whether capital punishment for the [conduct at 
issue] is regarded as unacceptable in our society.”90 In what follows, we will present 
the results of an analysis of every post-Furman execution for felony murder in the 
eighteen jurisdictions where capital punishment for an inadvertent killing is possible. 
Then, we will do the same with death sentences not yet carried out. As we will show, 
capital punishment for this conduct has become “truly unusual” as a matter of state 
practice.91 
1. Method—Focus Primarily on Executions 
Before turning to the results of our study, we must say a brief word about method. 
We will first analyze the actual executions carried out and give these the most weight 
as indicators of societal consensus—not death sentences given by juries, which we 
will analyze as a secondary indicator that is relevant, but less probative. We believe 
this approach is justified by doctrine as well as by the nature of the current system of 
post-conviction review. 
                                                                                                             
 
 90. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433. 
 91. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002)). 
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First, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court has moved away from an emphasis on 
death sentences in favor of looking at executions. In both Atkins and Roper, only 
executions were counted during the discussion of state practice.92 The Court in 
Kennedy took note of the rarity of death sentences for the given conduct, but it 
seemed most persuaded by the total lack of executions, saying that it was this statistic 
that “confirm[ed] . . . that there is a social consensus . . . .”93 
This trend towards assessment of executions over death sentences, we believe, 
makes sense. As we will describe below, in the American capital punishment system, 
very few death sentences ever result in executions—and jurors know this. Thus, look-
ing at the larger set of death sentences misportrays community morality as harsher 
than it is. The clearest, most distilled representation of community morality will be 
those death sentences that survive the various layers of review and are actually car-
ried out. 
In coming to this conclusion, we are heavily influenced by the path-breaking re-
search conducted by James Liebman years ago. Asked in 1991 by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to study the rate of error in capital cases, Liebman found stun-
ning results: from 1973 to 1995, courts found prejudicial error in sixty-eight percent 
of all death sentences.94 Such review takes place at three stages: first on state direct 
review, next on state collateral (post-conviction) review, and then finally on federal 
habeas review. In 2000, Liebman reported as follows: 
Since Furman, an average of about 300 of the approximately 21,000 
homicides committed in the United States each year have resulted in a 
death sentence. Close to 100% of those sentences are reviewed on state 
direct appeal and, if affirmed, in a state post-conviction proceeding, and, 
if affirmed again, on federal habeas corpus. Remarkably, during the 
twenty-three-year period of our statistical study, 1973–1995, the result 
of this process was the reversal by state direct appeal or state post-con-
viction courts of at least 47% of the capital judgments they reviewed, and 
federal habeas reversal of 40% of the capital judgments that survived 
state review.95 
These observations continue to be true. According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) study conducted in 2013, of the 8466 death sentences issued from 1973 to 
2013, 3194 were overturned by appellate courts.96 
But it would be an exaggeration to think that even one-third of the death sentences 
are ultimately carried out even after running the appellate gauntlet. Many offenders 
                                                                                                             
 
 92. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. The Court did not count death sentences of the mentally dis-
abled. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65. 
 93. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433. 
 94. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973–1995, at 8 (Colum. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 15, 2000) https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=232712 [https://perma.cc/W7KG-SCEJ]. 
 95. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2052–
54 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 96. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013—
STATISTICAL TABLES (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/2N4K-F4ZM]. 
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simply die on death row of natural causes during the long period of review (an aver-
age of eleven years when Liebman was writing, and an average of fifteen years to-
day).97 Others are granted executive clemency, and some benefit from subsequent 
abolition of the death penalty in their state. According to the BJS, of the 8466 death 
sentences, 509 of the offenders died of other causes, and 392 were granted clem-
ency.98 Only 1359 of the 8466 sentences resulted in a completed execution, while a 
total of 2959 remained on death row.99 Thus, of death sentences reaching final reso-
lution in the forty years following Furman v. Georgia, only 22% were executed. 
According to data compiled by the Death Penalty Information Center, about 1 in 10 
of those executed have been volunteers (e.g., defendants who declined to exhaust 
their legal remedies).100 If these cases are removed, the portion of death sentences 
surviving all forms of review is 20%. Of all death sentences imposed from 1973 to 
2013, only 16% were executed.  
Liebman’s exhaustive research demonstrated that the jury was not the primary 
decider of who lives and who dies, and that this task was instead mostly left to the 
appellate courts. “In the guise of enforcing criminal procedural rights,” he wrote, 
“our post-trial review processes in fact have come to play an essential role in the 
substantive determination of who lives and who dies.”101 Trial-level decisionmakers, 
therefore, “drastically overproduce death sentences.”102 Liebman explains that this is 
the unintended consequence of an overtaxed death penalty defense bar that has in-
vested most of its limited resources in the appeals stage.103 
For our purposes, it is significant that juries know that they are not running the 
show. Liebman shows that juries (correctly) understand that most of the death sen-
tences they assign will never be carried out, and therefore feel diminished responsi-
bility for their choice: “Realizing that intense post-trial scrutiny makes execution an 
unlikely outcome of a death sentence, they are encouraged to impose death verdicts 
that fully responsible jurors would realize are not deserved, thus necessitating intense 
post-trial scrutiny to catch their mistakes.”104 One study cited by Liebman found that, 
                                                                                                             
 
 97. Id. More recent executions show average wait times of fifteen years. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Information on Defendants Who Were Executed Since 1976 and Designated as 
“Volunteers,” DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/information-defendants-who-were-executed-1976-and-
designated-volunteers [https://perma.cc/MF4Y-JBJD]. 
 101. Liebman, supra note 95, at 2032 (emphasis in original). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 2073 (“[V]ery early on they made a crucial (probably disastrous, though proba-
bly unavoidable) strategic decision to concentrate their efforts at the post-conviction stages, 
causing the state to expend huge amounts of resources at those same stages to counter their 
efforts. The result is that the pro-death penalty forces have their way at trial, essentially gen-
erating as many death sentences as it is professionally rewarding to generate, while anti-death 
penalty lawyers are able at the later stages of the process, if not to have their way, then at least 
to have substantial success exposing the astonishingly high amounts of error rates documented 
above.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 104. Id. at 2119. On the other hand, prosecutors cannot tell jurors that their decision may 
have no effect. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
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after interviews with 153 capital jurors, most “felt little responsibility for death sen-
tences and less for executions.”105 Carol and Jordan Steiker call this phenomenon 
“the diffusion of moral responsibility.”106 
 A second consideration militating against excessive reliance on capital sentences 
as evidence of the moral standards of society is the practice of restricting capital jury 
service to “death-qualified” jurors, as permitted in Witherspoon v. Illinois,107 
Wainwright v. Witt,108 Lockhart v. McCree,109 and Uttecht v. Brown.110 Social science 
research indicates that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict and condemn 
than members of the general public,111 and likely underrepresent racial minorities.112 
In a recent study of capital juries in Louisiana, Aliza Cover found that 22.5% of 
potential jurors and 33% of black jurors were struck on grounds of opposition to the 
death penalty.113 Cover concluded that:  
 The process of death qualification produces jury verdicts that diverge from 
community estimations of the cruelty of the death penalty; from a 
statistical standpoint, the data set of capital jury verdicts is a biased sample. 
Disqualified jurors are excluded not only from capital jury service in each 
                                                                                                             
 
 105. Liebman, supra note 95, at 2118 n.213 (citing Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey 
& Martin T. Wells, Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. 
L. REV. 339, 352–54, 362–64 (1996)) (“[D]iscussing post-sentencing interviews with 153 ac-
tual capital jurors, revealing that they felt little responsibility for death sentences and less for 
executions and that, ‘[o]n the whole, jurors simply do not believe that defendants sentenced to 
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individual case but also from the constitutional conversation about whether 
the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.114 
Given these observations, we believe that death sentences are not the most probative 
index of the moral viewpoints in our society. The Court’s movement towards 
assessment of actual executions—those that have survived the various layers of re-
view—makes sense. These layers of review provide important opportunities for moral 
input.  
During state appellate review, many high courts independently review the record 
and reweigh aggravating and mitigating factors, and this task often requires the ap-
plication of moral considerations (e.g., whether a murder was “heinous”).115 In other 
states, independent review goes even beyond reweighing, and allows for completely 
open-ended considerations of justice. For example, in Colorado the supreme court 
reviews the “propriety” of the sentence “having regard to . . . the public interest”;116 in 
Nevada, the court can consider “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive, con-
sidering both the crime and the defendant.”117 
Also indicative of the moral consensus of society is the final hurdle: the decision by 
the state executive to withhold clemency, and ultimately to issue a death warrant. These 
decisions are usually highly publicized, and allow for public opinion to affect the 
execution. 
2. The Execution Data 
Now, we turn to the “statistics” of executions for inadvertent killing.118 As we will 
demonstrate, at least three and no more than five defendants have been executed where 
the evidence presents a plausible case of inadvertent killing. 
Before reaching this result though, we must further clarify our methods.119 Our aim 
is to determine the number of instances where a defendant, convicted on a theory of 
felony murder, as a principal (i.e., an actual killer) rather than an accomplice, is 
executed even when the facts present a colorable claim that the death of the victim was 
inadvertently caused.120  
To achieve this aim, we employed a team of research assistants—all law students—
to determine the facts of every case in which a principal in a felony murder was 
executed, in the eighteen states where execution for inadvertent killing is doctrinally 
permissible.121 Research assistants were supplied with murder and capital sentencing 
                                                                                                             
 
 114. Id. at 115–16. 
 115. See, e.g., State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (Ariz. 1989), aff’d, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).  
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statutes in the pertinent states. They used capital punishment databases to identify every 
defendant executed in each of these states since the reestablishment of capital 
punishment in 1976,122 and then examined high court opinions to identify defendants 
clearly convicted of premeditated murder and defendants convicted of felony murder 
as accomplices who did not kill personally. For the remaining cases—possible felony 
murders in which the defendant actually killed—research assistants examined state 
high court opinions and newspaper articles to discover the facts of the underlying 
homicide.  
The research assistants then coded each case involving the perpetrator of felony 
murder for five categories of information: the predicate felonies underlying the felony 
murder charge, the method of attack, the duration of attack, the coder’s impression of 
the intentionality of the attack, and the victim’s characteristics. In describing the 
method of attack, research assistants particularly noted any weapons used. In de-
scribing the duration of the attack, research assistants noted available information 
regarding the number and nature of blows or injuries. Research assistants were not 
asked to identify a culpable mental state with respect to death in judging the inten-
tionality of the attack. Instead, the focus was on whether shots, blows, or other types of 
injurious contact were intentionally directed at victims. However, research assistants 
were encouraged to explain their judgments, and these explanations sometimes noted 
an admission of intent to kill or evidence of a motive for killing. Finally, in describing 
victim characteristics, research assistants noted characteristics such as youth, age, 
disability, or ill-health that might have rendered the victim more fragile, or less able to 
resist the predicate felony.  
The authors then reviewed the summaries created by the research assistants. The 
authors independently assessed the culpability with respect to death in all cases where 
we concluded that the variables coded by the students gave rise to a potential case of 
inadvertent killing. We took special care to independently review the facts of any 
killing where a weapon was not used; where a weapon was not clearly identified; where 
death was produced by a single shot or blow; where the type of weapon used is not 
commonly lethal; where the primary method of attack was bludgeoning, asphyxiation, 
strangulation,123 drowning, or vehicular collision; where the student researcher 
expressed doubt as to whether the attack was intentional; or where the basis of the 
researcher’s judgment that the attack was intentional was not apparent. All of the 
borderline cases that we found are discussed below in detail.124 
Having outlined our method, we are ready to discuss our results. Before we begin, 
we should note that this discussion is necessarily quite graphic. Because the Supreme 
Court has not required any official determination of culpability with respect to death 
in these cases, researchers must often infer the defendant’s culpability from his or 
                                                                                                             
 
 122.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 123. In considering strangulation cases, we viewed the use of a ligature as evidence of 
intent to kill, while viewing manual strangulation as more ambiguous. Conceivably an assail-
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her conduct. From 1976 through 2016, the eighteen jurisdictions where capital pun-
ishment for inadvertent killing is possible executed 487 people.125 Of these 487, a 
little less than half—220 people—were convicted for actually killing a victim, under 
a felony-murder theory of liability only.126  
Of the 220 felony murders, 195 involved the use of a gun, blunt weapon, knife, or 
strangulation.127 One hundred and eleven felony murderers killed their victims with 
firearms. Forty felony murderers were executed for using a bladed weapon to kill 
their victims. Twenty-two felony murderers were executed for bludgeoning their vic-
tims. Twenty-two felony murderers were executed for strangling their victims. Six 
felony murderers were executed for using other means of killing, such as vehicles, 
drowning, or fires. Nine murders were committed by means of suffocation. Nine 
murders were committed by means of a weaponless beating. 
 
We will now discuss each case we have identified as a possibly inadvertent kill-
ing, and every other case in which an argument for inadvertence could have been 
made.  
 Of the 195 executions involving homicides committed with weapons or strangu-
lation, almost all involve clear evidence of intentional killing. Take, for example, the 
North Carolina case of David Lawson, who committed the following acts during a 
burglary: “He ordered the man out of the truck; and, although the man begged de-
fendant not to shoot, defendant forced him to walk toward the patio and shot him in 
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the back of his head.”128 Even without facts as egregious as this—say a victim was 
running away when an assailant shot him once in the back—the intentional use of a 
deadly weapon provides strong evidence of a culpable mental state of at least reck-
lessness with respect to the victim’s death. The same is true of the cases involving 
the intentional use of bladed weapons, bludgeons, and strangulation: the deadly na-
ture of the mechanism of injury permits a very strong inference of recklessness. 
Recklessness here is the conscious disregard of a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” 
of the victim’s death, which is created by conduct that is a “gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion.”129 The use of a deadly weapon or a deadly technique (strangulation) to effec-
tuate a felonious end poses a substantial and unjustified risk to life; and the unprivi-
leged use of deadly force is the paradigmatic example of a deviation from law-
abiding conduct.  
In a few cases, defendants claimed they used deadly weapons unintentionally, but 
these claims were not credible. In the Oklahoma case of Fields v. State, the burglary 
victim was shot with her own gun.130 Fields claimed that the victim’s finger was on 
the trigger when the gun fired as he struggled with her for possession of it,131 but 
both forensic evidence and eyewitness testimony belied his account.132 The bullet 
entered the victim’s head from the rear and was fired from at least six inches away. 
A witness described a shooter who calmly looked at the witness, looked back at the 
victim, and then fired.133 In the South Carolina case of State v. Drayton, defendant 
robbed a store, abducted the store clerk, forced her to drive him to a secluded river-
side pier, shot her between the eyes, dropped her body off the pier, and then took her 
car.134 He later claimed that the victim willingly accompanied him to the pier, and 
that he shot her involuntarily, when he stumbled against a railing.135 In the South 
Carolina case of State v. McWee, the defendant shot a store clerk twice in the head 
before robbing the cash register.136 At trial he claimed that he shot the victim the first 
time “by accident” and the second time “by mistake”; but during the sentencing phase 
he instead claimed he was forced to shoot the victim by a co-felon.137 
One bludgeoning case involved a similarly hollow claim of exculpation. In the 
North Carolina case of State v. Powell, defendant claimed he panicked while robbing 
a store clerk and had no intention of hurting her. When she slapped him, he picked 
up a tire iron and bludgeoned her repeatedly on the head, causing multiple fractures 
and a fatal brain hemorrhage, and left her in a pool of blood.138 We found no cases 
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where defendants claimed to have stabbed or strangled their victims unwittingly. All 
of the killings by “other means” were clearly intentional.139  
The eight suffocation cases include two cases where the defendants’ intentions 
are harder to determine, because the circumstantial evidence left some doubt as to 
exactly how the suffocation was accomplished. In the Oklahoma case of Lott v. State, 
the defendant broke into the homes of four elderly women and raped them.140 Two 
of the women died by asphyxiation. It appears that in both cases the defendant 
brought a knotted rag to gag the victims, but also forced pillows over their faces.141 
In the South Carolina case of State v. Middleton, an escaped prisoner raped and as-
phyxiated two victims on successive days and mutilated the bodies after death.142 In 
the second case (for which he was executed), he claimed to have left the victim bound 
and gagged while he went to a store, and found her dead on his return.143 Because he 
burned the body, this account could not be corroborated.144 Neither Lott nor 
Middleton was proven to have killed intentionally, but both assailants persisted in a 
life-threatening method of sexual assault after fatally asphyxiating a prior victim. We 
therefore consider these killings reckless.  
Determining the killer’s mental state in a weaponless beating case can be more 
difficult. Relevant considerations might be the number, force, and location of the 
blows, and the fragility of the victim. In three of our nine weaponless beating cases, 
Gilson v. Simmons, Workman v. Mullin, and State v. Berry, findings of a culpable 
mental state of recklessness or intent to kill were made by the jury or a reviewing 
court.145 In a fourth case, the Georgia case Young v. State, we consider the evidence 
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of reckless indifference to human life to be sufficient. Here the defendant broke into 
the homes of six elderly victims in one night and “severely [beat], kicked and 
stomped” them.146 Three of the victims died, and the defendant afterwards made 
statements implying that he wished to harm more people in the same way.147 Here, 
as in the Lott and Middleton cases, we find the repeated use of a fatal method of 
attack on multiple victims to be strong evidence of conscious disregard of a substan-
tial risk of death.  
The remaining five weaponless cases offer less evidence of culpability with re-
spect to death. In discussing these, we will note the year of the offense and the year 
of sentencing, to consider whether any trend is discernible.  
The Georgia case of Roy Blankenship, sentenced in 1980, resentenced in 1982 
and 1986, and executed in 2011, presents a potentially inadvertent killing.148 The 
defendant broke into the home of a seventy-eight-year-old woman with respiratory 
illness, and beat her and raped her.149 She became unconscious during her initial en-
counter with the defendant, and then during the rape she was apparently beaten and 
penetrated with foreign objects.150 According to the court, “Forensic evidence estab-
lished that the victim died from heart failure brought on by the trauma.”151 While the 
defendant knew that his victim was a frail elderly woman, he did not know of her 
pre-existing medical conditions, and he did not use a weapon.152 Blankenship com-
mitted his crime in 1978.153  
A California case presents another possibly inadvertent killer—Manuel Babbitt, 
sentenced in 1982 and executed in 1999.154 Babbitt is another case arising from a 
burglary where the victim was an elderly woman with medical conditions: 
According to the pathologist, [the victim] died from a heart attack 
brought on by a severe beating and possible suffocation. She also showed 
signs of possible rape. Her body had suffered numerous lacerations and 
abrasions. Had [the victim] not suffered from coronary disease, and had 
she not experienced physical and psychological stress caused by fright, 
the struggle, and pain from her wounds, the physical blows she received 
would not of themselves have proved fatal.155 
As in Blankenship’s case, Babbitt’s victim died mostly because of her peculiar 
frailty.156 This particularity of the victim’s condition, unknown as it was to Babbitt, 
diminishes his culpability; moreover, no deadly weapon was used. Babbitt’s crime 
was committed in 1980. 
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Next to consider is the North Carolina case of Frank Chandler, sentenced in 1993 
and executed in 2004.157 This is another homicide that occurred during the burglary 
of an elderly female’s home.158 A pathologist testified that the ninety-year-old victim 
“died from a single ‘massive blow’ to the head. The blow resulted in a hinge fracture 
to the scalp, which effectively caused the skull to snap in two . . . .”159 Nevertheless, 
the defendant gave a statement saying he had punched the victim once, and apart 
from the force of the blow, there was no evidence to prove that any weapon had been 
used. Chandler committed the murder in 1992. 
The Oklahoma case of James Malicoat, sentenced in 1998 and executed in 2006, 
also raises questions about the defendant’s mental state.160 In this case, the defendant 
engaged in a long course of child abuse that the court described as “torture” of a 
thirteen-month-old victim.161 The conduct that ultimately caused the child’s death 
was (1) hitting her head against a bed frame, causing two subdural hematomas and 
(2) punching her twice in the abdomen with such force as to break her ribs and detach 
her internal organs from the abdominal wall.162 The pathologist described the ab-
dominal injuries as “non-survivable.”163 The defendant claimed that after the child 
stopped breathing he revived her with CPR, yet he made no effort to get medical 
assistance for the child and instead went to sleep. Nor did he alert anyone on later 
finding the child dead.164 At trial, though, Malicoat stated that he had no intention of 
killing the victim and thought she would withstand the punishment: “he claimed he 
had suffered through such extreme abuse as a child that he did not realize his actions 
would seriously hurt or kill Tessa.”165 This case may fall below the level of reckless-
ness with respect to death; it is rare that punches to the stomach result in death, and 
pushing someone’s head into a fixed object is often less forceful than striking the 
head with a bludgeon. On the other hand, a reasonable person would recognize the 
great fragility of a thirteen-month-old baby, and a jury is always entitled to disbelieve 
a defendant’s claims that unreasonable beliefs were sincerely held. The facts of this 
case are comparable to those in the Berry, Workman, and Gilson cases, where find-
ings of recklessness or intent were made. But while a jury or reviewing court could 
certainly have found reckless indifference to human life on these facts, no such find-
ing was made. Malicoat committed the crime in 1997. 
Last to consider is another Oklahoma case, that of Charles Warner, originally 
sentenced in 1997, resentenced in 2003, and finally executed in 2015.166 The de-
fendant raped and killed an eleven-month-old child.167 The evidence showed two 
skull fractures and two jaw fractures, and a doctor also found retinal hemorrhages 
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“consistent with a violent shaking.”168 The medical examiner “determined the 
cause of death to be multiple injuries to the victim’s head, chest, and abdomen.”169 
The cause of the fractures was not identified—the medical examiner referred to a 
“crushing type injury” of the head.170 The defendant claimed that they came from 
impact with a wooden bedframe.171 There was no direct evidence of the use of a 
weapon, and the jury did not find this fact. Still, there was eyewitness evidence of 
both blows to the child and shaking, failure to summon medical help, and forensic 
evidence of sexual assault.172 As in Malicoat, these facts could have justified a 
finding of reckless indifference to human life, but none was made. Warner com-
mitted his crime in 1997. 
In our view, these five cases are the only executions where there is a plausible 
claim that the killing was inadvertent. Some readers might exclude baby abusers 
Malicoat and Warner from this group. Thus, the number of inadvertent killers ex-
ecuted since the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976 is at least three and 
no more than five.  
Regardless of the precise figure chosen, the important implication of this anal-
ysis is that executions of even possibly inadvertent killers are truly unusual. Our 
conclusion is that in the forty-four years since Furman v. Georgia,173 in all juris-
dictions where such an execution is legislatively possible (eighteen), only five de-
fendants were executed for a possibly inadvertent killing, and in only four states 
out of fifty. Moreover, two of the five cases came from one state—Oklahoma—
and both Oklahoma cases were prosecuted under the State’s troubling child abuse 
murder statute, which requires no culpability towards death, or even injury.174 
These two cases represent the only defendants executed for a possibly inadvertent 
killing who were sentenced within the last twenty years. None of the five felony 
murders was committed within the last twenty years. 
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The second objective indicator, state practice, confirms the conclusion supported 
by the first (legislation): a societal consensus has emerged against capital punishment 
for inadvertent killing. 
As with legislation, it is helpful to compare the “unusualness” with past cases 
recognizing new Eighth Amendment standards of decency: 
 
Case Punishment Practice 
 
Death 
Sentences 
 
Executions 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407 (2008) 
Offense:  
child rape 
2 on death row, 
in one state 0 (1964–2008) 
Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
Offender: 
juvenile <18 70 on death row 
In 6 states 
(1989–2005);  
in 3 states 
(1995–2005). 
Atkins v. Virginia, 
 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
Offender: 
mentally 
disabled 
Not provided In 5 states (1989–2002) 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 829 (1988) 
Offender: 
juvenile <16 5 (1982– 1986) 0 (since 1948) 
Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) 
Offender:  
insane Not provided Not provided 
Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782 (1982) 
Offense: 
vicarious felony 
murder 
3 on death 
row (in 1982) 6 (1954–1982) 
Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584 (1977) 
Offense:  
adult rape 5 (1973–1977) Not provided 
 
If only five potentially inadvertent killers have been executed in forty years, in 
only four jurisdictions, then this number aligns closely with the numbers in past 
Supreme Court holdings regarding the frequency of state practice. It is fewer than 
the six executions in a twenty-eight-year period cited in Enmund, the executions in 
five states in a thirteen-year period in Atkins, and the executions in six states in a 
sixteen-year period in Roper. It seems that state legal decision makers, whether 
prosecutors, juries, reviewing courts, or governors, have rejected the application 
of the death penalty for this conduct. 
3. Sentencing Data 
We have discussed what we believe to be, and what the Court has treated as, the 
most probative metric of societal standards of decency in the imposition of capital 
punishment—actual executions. We now turn to a supplementary data set: current 
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death row inmates. This data shows the conduct for which sentencers—mostly ju-
ries, but sometimes judges175— are willing to sentence offenders to death. It in-
cludes all those sentenced to death since the first guided discretion statutes were 
passed in 1973, except those actually executed (we have already analyzed these), 
and those who died from other causes, or whose sentences were overturned or com-
muted.176 We consider death row cases less probative of standards of decency than 
executions, yet still of value. Although the Supreme Court considered only execu-
tions in Atkins, and emphasized executions in Kennedy and Roper, it also consid-
ered death row cases in Coker, Enmund, Thompson, Roper, and Kennedy.  
We now turn to the data. As of the end of 2016, there were 1755 death row 
inmates in the eighteen states permitting execution of inadvertent felony murder-
ers.177 Of these, 570 were sentenced to death for actually killing under a felony 
murder theory of liability alone, and without any other finding of intent or premed-
itation. In determining these numbers, we employed the same methods described 
earlier with respect to executions, but with one important difference. Because the 
process of post-conviction review is still ongoing for current death row inmates, 
there are some cases for which there is not yet any reported opinion. For these 
cases, we relied on appellate briefs when they were available, and journalistic ac-
counts of the trial when they were not.178  
The methods of killing break down as follows.179 Most prevalent were shoot-
ings, which constituted 250 of the death sentences. Stabbings made up 133 of the 
set, followed by seventy-nine strangulations. The next largest category is bludg-
eonings, with forty-seven capital sentences. The remaining methods of killing in-
volving dangerous weapons or instrumentalities are less frequent: eleven victims 
were burned to death, ten were suffocated, four were drowned, and two were killed 
with vehicles. Twenty-four death sentences were given for weaponless beatings, 
and two for deaths caused by injuries from sexual penetration alone. In one case, 
the victim was bound and gagged and left in a room alone for three days. Finally, 
in four cases there is either insufficient evidence in the record to determine cause 
of death, or there is insufficient public information. Absence of evidence of intent 
does not equate with presence of evidence of inadvertence, but we do note that 
                                                                                                             
 
 175. In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s 
sentencing scheme leaving to a judge the determinations of the aggravating circumstances 
rendering the defendant death-eligible. This decision was overturned in Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002). However, defendants may still be sentenced by judges if they waive 
their right to jury sentencing. 
 176. Although death sentences of people who died of natural causes in prison without 
winning appellate relief could in theory be relevant to our survey, restricting our data set to 
the people currently on death row (about 2800) accommodates the logistical constraints of 
getting detailed information from official and journalistic sources about the conduct of de-
fendants. In addition, since the average time on death row for current inmates is about 
twenty years, this dataset reasonably reflects death sentencing for a large part of post-Gregg 
history.  
 177. Deathrow Coding Spreadsheet on File with the Indiana Law Journal. A surprisingly 
large number of these inmates, 748, were in one state, California.  
 178. We had to rely on such sources for ninety-one of 316 California cases, but only 
thirteen of the remaining 251 cases from other jurisdictions. See infra Appendix B.  
 179. See id. 
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these cases represent troubling manifestations of the felony murder rule’s tendency 
to allow capital juries to ignore culpability altogether.180 
This information is represented graphically below:  
                                                                                                             
 
 180. Three cases involved the discovery of a body under circumstances making foul play 
obvious, but where the condition of the body obscured the cause of death. Brief of 
Respondent-Appellee, People v. Baker (Cal. 2015) (No. S170280), 2015 CA S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1016 (finding that decomposed state of body dumped in desert made cause of death 
impossible to determine, but defendant had threatened victim and physical evidence indi-
cated he sexually assaulted her in her home and disposed of her body); Informal Response 
to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Ghobrial, 2015 WL 3491924 (Cal. 2015) (No. 
S218292) (dismembered body of child victim of sexual assault makes cause of death uncer-
tain); Brief of Respondent, People v. Westerfield (Cal. 2012) (No. S112691), 2012 WL 
5392372 (decomposed body of child victim found in desert made cause of death and occur-
rence of sexual assault impossible to determine, but circumstantial evidence implicated de-
fendant in abduction of victim and disposal of body). These circumstances make it hard to 
rule out an inadvertent killing, but the combination of a motive to eliminate a witness and 
elaborate efforts to dispose of a body provide some evidence of intent to kill. A fourth case, 
People v. Jackson, 376 P.3d 528 (Cal. 2016), is problematic for other reasons. The defend-
ant was implicated in the brutal rape of an eighty-four-year-old woman. In the course of a 
rambling and inconsistent statement about that crime, the defendant misdescribed the victim 
to police as having red hair and claimed to have stabbed her and pushed her out of a car on 
a highway leading to Las Vegas. The rape victim experienced neither of these types of at-
tacks. However, an eighty-two-year-old woman with red hair residing in the same neigh-
borhood had disappeared after a break-in around the same time and her car was later found 
in Las Vegas. No physical evidence tied the defendant to the scene of the break-in or the 
car, and no body was ever found. However, a canine officer testified that a scent dog tracked 
the defendant to an interrogation room after smelling an envelope taken from the scene of 
the break-in. The jury, hearing this evidence, including evidence about the brutal interracial 
rape of the other victim, convicted and sentenced the defendant to death. Because the de-
fendant described stabbing a victim and pushing her out of a car, the case arguably presents 
evidence of recklessness. Yet it seems unlikely that the jury would have convicted him of 
murder or condemned him to death on such scant evidence if they did not know the defend-
ant had committed the rape of another victim.  
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After examining the facts of these 570 cases, we have determined that only fifteen 
cases present death sentences for arguably inadvertent killings. In what follows, we 
will begin by examining cases of weaponless beatings and sexual penetrations, where 
culpability with respect to death is often lowest. Then, we will turn to cases where 
unquestionably deadly instrumentalities are claimed to have nevertheless caused 
death inadvertently. These cases involve fire and firearms.  
Before we begin this factual review in some detail, an acknowledgment and a 
caveat are in order. First, we again acknowledge that the details are disturbingly 
graphic. Indeed, they often reflect conduct of great heinousness. Yet it is important 
to remember that we are not here presenting the evidence offered in support of miti-
gation in these cases, often including tragic life circumstances that are similarly dis-
turbing.  
Second, we offer the caveat that our inferences about the facts of cases—the few 
we discuss and the many we do not—based only on the sources we have had at hand, 
are in no way meant to bear on the factual merits of the claims of any inmates who 
are currently litigating nor are likely to litigate these claims on appellate or post-
conviction review. Nor do we imply any judgments about the manner in which the 
attorneys litigated the cases—including their choice to raise defenses (or not), or their 
chosen emphasis of certain facts.  
i. Weaponless Beatings & Sexual Penetration 
As stated earlier, weaponless beatings often present questionable cases of reck-
lessness with respect to death because of the correct perception that blows from hands 
and fists do not usually kill. This causal uncertainty is even more significant with 
sexual penetration (except perhaps in the case of very small infants). This ambiguity 
bears itself out in a number of actual cases—all of which involve either children or 
elderly victims. 
Benjamin Cole was sentenced to death by an Oklahoma jury in 2004 for killing 
his nine-month-old daughter by snapping her spine in half: he “grabbed [her] by the 
ankles and pushed her legs toward her head until she flipped over.”181 He claimed 
this was in an attempt to get her to stop crying.182 As she lay dying, he took no action 
to call for aid and denied that the child was hurt when his wife confronted him.183 
Cole was convicted of “child abuse murder” for the “willful or malicious” use of 
“unreasonable force.”184 This killing was arguably inadvertent: there was only one 
act of force, no weapon, and no witnesses. However, the failure to seek medical at-
tention does bespeak potential recklessness.  
Devin Bennett was sentenced to death by a Mississippi jury in 2003 for what was 
likely shaking an infant and causing a head injury (either by striking the head or by 
throwing the infant to the floor).185 Three medical experts testified that the baby suf-
fered a closed head injury as a result of “shaken baby syndrome, or the severe and 
                                                                                                             
 
 181. Cole v. Trammell, 755 F.3d 1142, 1147 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 1164.  
 185. Bennett v. State, 933 So. 2d 930, 936 (Miss. 2006). 
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violent shaking of an infant.”186 One physician testified that the injuries were con-
sistent with “someone taking the ten week old baby and just shaking them[sic] throw-
ing them[sic] to the ground.”187 We discussed above the problems with the “shaken 
baby” cases, and we reiterate those concerns here. The shaking could have been done 
without an awareness of its deadly potential, and the same could be said about the 
single blow to the head. This is an arguably inadvertent killing. 
Jeffrey Havard was sentenced to death by a Mississippi jury for the 2002 murder 
of a six-month-old child.188 Medical experts testified that the cause of death was a 
closed head injury “consistent with shaken baby syndrome.”189 The only other inju-
ries were abrasions in the mouth and penetration of the anus (likely by an object), 
but neither was a contributing cause of death, and the defendant’s DNA was not 
found inside the victim’s vagina or anus.190 Here, there is little evidence showing the 
defendant’s recklessness with respect to death—just the shaking. 
William Wilson was sentenced to death by a Mississippi judge in 2007.191 The 
victim in his case was a two-year-old child who died “due to a closed head injury,” 
and Wilson “confessed that he had hit Malorie in the head with his fist three times.”192 
The court noted that the victim was “less tha[n] 20 pounds” in weight, and that she 
died eight hours after the blows.193 The defendant waited to call for help during most 
of this period, “because of fears associated with bruises on the face and body of the 
child and suspicions that might be aroused when they were seen by health care pro-
viders.”194 While striking a child with a closed fist repeatedly is dangerous, it is un-
clear whether or not Wilson recognized the danger of death. This is possibly an in-
advertent killing. 
Andrew Lukehart was sentenced to death by a Florida jury in 1997 for the killing 
of a five-month-old infant.195 The medical examiner testified that “prior to death the 
baby had received five blows to her head, two of which created fractures.”196 He 
stated that “these injuries could have resulted only from the use of substantial force” 
and that to break a skull such force would be “equal to the force of dropping a child 
from a height greater than four to five feet.”197 Lukehart’s version of the story was 
                                                                                                             
 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. at 937. 
 188. Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 778 (Miss. 2006). Note that in September 2018, 
Havard’s death sentence was vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Jerry 
Mitchell, After 16 years, Jeffrey Havard Is Off Mississippi’s Death Row, CLARION LEDGER 
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2018/09/14/after-16-years-
jeffrey-havard-off-mississippis-death-row/1296190002 [https://perma.cc/3CWJ-WP8E]. This 
was based on new doubts about the cause of death given increasing skepticism of “shaken 
baby syndrome” in medical literature. Id. However, the death penalty is still a valid option for 
the resentencing jury. 
 189. Havard v. State, 988 So. 2d 322, 326 (Miss. 2008). 
 190. Havard, 928 So. 2d at 778–79. 
 191. Wilson v. State, 21 So. 3d 572, 576 (Miss. 2009). 
 192. Id. at 574, 575. 
 193. Id. at 592. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 2000). 
 196. Id. at 911. 
 197. Id. at 922. 
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that, during diaper changing, he forcibly pushed the baby onto the floor to prevent it 
from moving during the cleaning.198 The court noted that, even taking this motive as 
true, because Lukehart had applied such force, “[t]he jury could have reasonably 
concluded that Lukehart was frustrated by the baby’s need for a clean diaper and by 
the baby’s movement . . . .”199 Lukehart attempted to hide the body and create a false 
story, but claimed that he did so because he “did not intend to kill the baby . . . .”200 
He eventually revealed the body’s location.201 Lukehart involves a complicated set 
of facts, and presents an arguable case of inadvertent killing. While the infant re-
ceived five blows, the defendant’s explanation of their origin is plausible, and acting 
out of “frustration” at a squirming baby does not equate with intent to kill or reck-
lessness with respect to death. Note, however, that the jury found that Lukehart “‘in-
tentionally or knowingly’ caused great bodily harm,” and the infliction of such harm 
on an infant may be seen as recklessly indifferent to life.202 
Toney Davis was sentenced to death by a Florida jury203 in 1994.204 The victim, a 
two-year-old child, died of “bruising, swelling of the brain, and pools of blood in the 
skull.”205 There was evidence of vaginal penetration, but this did not contribute to 
the death.206 The medical examiner testified that the death was caused by “four sep-
arate blows to the head . . . .”207 A bystander testified that she heard a child crying, 
and then “a lot of thumping noises,” and then “[s]he heard Davis say in a loud, angry 
voice, ‘Sit down.’”208 She said that the “ruckus” lasted thirty minutes.209 The defend-
ant was witnessed giving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation in an attempt to revive the 
child.210 This is possibly an inadvertent killing, although the repeated blows to the 
head indicate potential recklessness. Also, the short time frame between the injury 
and the death (approximately one hour) indicates a severe beating.211  
Juan Velazquez was sentenced to death by an Arizona jury in 2004 for the beating 
of a twenty-month-old child:212 “Velazquez held Liana’s mouth shut to prevent her 
from crying, squeezed her stomach, and then repeatedly swept her feet out from un-
der her, causing her to fall backwards and hit her head on the floor.”213 He did this 
“several times,” after which the child became unresponsive.214 He then “placed her 
on the couch and covered her with a pillow,” and told the child’s mother that she was 
                                                                                                             
 
 198. Id. at 911. 
 199. Id. at 922. 
 200. Id. at 911. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at 922. 
 203. Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055, 1057–58 (Fla. 1997) (jury recommendation, judge 
accepted). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1057. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1056. 
 209. Id. at 1056–57. 
 210. Id. at 1056. 
 211. See id. 
 212. State v. Velazquez, 166 P.3d 91, 96 (Ariz. 2007). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id.  
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asleep and should be left alone.215 Later, after the mother discovered the child’s dead 
body, Velazquez dumped the body in a canal.216 According to the medical examiner, 
the cause of death was “blunt force trauma” to the head, with a “‘full thickness’ skull 
fracture . . . .”217 He opined that the victim suffered “at least six separate blows before 
her death.”218 This is arguably an inadvertent killing: according to the defendant’s 
statement, he did not strike the victim, but instead caused her to fall repeatedly. It is 
unlikely that falling, on its own, would have been understood by the defendant to 
carry a substantial risk of death. 
Corinio Pruitt was sentenced to death by a Tennessee jury in 2005.219 Pruitt killed 
a seventy-nine-year-old victim during a carjacking: “Mr. Pruitt ran up behind the 
older man and pushed him into the car. Although [a witness] could not see clearly 
into the car, it appeared to [the witness] that the two men were ‘tussling.’ . . . After 
about fifteen seconds, she saw Mr. Pruitt throw the older man to the ground, slam the 
car door, and drive away.”220 The victim died of head injuries, but was found to have 
a condition that made him prone to bleeding (coagulopathy), and also to have reduced 
bone density due to age (osteoporosis).221 His conditions together made him “partic-
ularly vulnerable to injury.”222 Three medical experts testified, and all disagreed on 
whether the head injury was caused by punches, a mere fall, or being slammed into 
the ground. According to the prosecution’s medical examiner, the cause of death was 
“at least three separate blows or impacts to the left side of the head,” and the injuries 
were “consistent with being beaten.”223 A medical expert for the defense found evi-
dence that the injury was of the type caused “when a moving head hits a fixed object,” 
and not when a moving object (such as a fist) strikes a fixed head.224 He opined that 
the cause of death was “a fall to a flat surface,” and “ruled out the possibility that 
blows or strikes to [the] body were the sole cause of [the] injuries.”225 A third medical 
expert, for the prosecution, testified that the injuries were “indicative of at least two 
separate blows,” and concluded that the cause of death was likely being thrown with 
force into the ground.226 This is likely an inadvertent killing, and the divergent med-
ical testimony shows that there was a dispute as to how much force the killer used. 
Even assuming the worst scenario—punches and slamming to the ground—it is hard 
to see this conduct as rising to the level of recklessness with respect to death. Alt-
hough Pruitt knew the victim was elderly, he could not have known of his bleeding 
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 219. State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 186 (Tenn. 2013). 
 220. Id. at 187. 
 221. Id. at 192. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. at 191–92. 
 224. Id. at 193 (“contre-coup” or “decelerating” injury). 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 194.  
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and bone conditions that made him particularly vulnerable. The jury found the ag-
gravating circumstance of a “knowing” killing by one having a “substantial role” in 
a predicate felony,227 but the presence of “knowledge” on these facts seems dubious.  
Brandon Taylor was sentenced to death by a California jury in 1996 for the death 
of an eighty-year-old woman following a forcible rape.228 He broke into the woman’s 
home, and pushed her and her sister into the bedroom.229 A witness overheard him 
say, “I don’t want to have to hurt you,” after which he grew frustrated at her re-
sistance and “slammed her onto the floor near the side of the bed, banging her head 
. . . .”230 During the ensuing rape, the victim “started breathing hard and gasping for 
air.”231 After ejaculating, he let go of the victim’s head, “and let it drop to the floor,” 
at which point she was “ashen and no longer breathing or moving.”232 Medical ex-
perts testified that the cause of death was “the extreme fear, pain, and stress the sex-
ual assaults caused,” with “natural hormonal responses . . . caus[ing] . . . abnormal 
heart rhythms, which led to cardiac arrest . . . .”233 According to these experts, the 
victim’s age was crucial to the deadly result, and “a younger woman would have 
survived the attack.”234 We believe this is an inadvertent killing. It was certainly un-
intentional: even the California Supreme Court noted that “there was no evidence 
suggesting defendant harbored any intent to kill the victim . . . .”235 In our view, it 
was not reckless, either. The only injuries the defendant intentionally caused were 
sexual penetration and the slam to the floor, but these physical injuries did not kill 
the victim. The likelihood that the victim would die out of pure fright was not a like-
lihood that would have been appreciated by the perpetrator or by most people.  
A California jury sentenced Vincente Benavides to death in 1993 for causing the 
death of a twenty-one-month-old girl during a rape.236 The cause of death was inter-
nal bleeding caused by penile penetration of the victim’s anus, which had expanded 
the anus to “seven or eight times its normal size.”237 Other injuries (that did not cause 
death) included broken ribs and bleeding in the head, suggesting shaking during the 
rape, and facial abrasions indicating a hand covering the victim’s mouth.238 It is un-
likely that the defendant adverted to the possibility of death in this case. First, anal 
penetration is not usually a deadly act, and in this case, there was evidence that the 
defendant had indeed sodomized the victim before (of course, without causing 
death).239 Moreover, when the victim was taken to the hospital, the nature of her 
                                                                                                             
 
 227. Id. at 205. 
 228. People v. Taylor, 229 P.3d 12, 29 (Cal. 2010). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 30. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 31. 
 235. Id. at 59. 
 236. People v. Benavides, 105 P.3d 1099, 1104–05 (Cal. 2005). 
 237. Id. at 1105. 
 238. Id. at 1106.  
 239. Id. at 1113 (“Medical evidence established Consuelo had suffered prior internal inju-
ries similar to the fatal injuries suffered on November 17, 1991.”). 
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injuries were not apparent for multiple hours, and not until the abdomen became dis-
tended due to bleeding.240 Finally, given the age of the victim, there was no motive 
to kill her so as to eliminate a witness. 
Victor Miranda-Guerrero was sentenced to death by a California jury in 2003 for 
a death that occurred during a rape.241 The defendant claimed that the victim was 
squatting between cars to urinate and fell over and hit her head on a curb due to 
inebriation.242 However, at one point he also admitted to hitting her in the head.243 
The victim was found in the street in a coma, with an apparent punch to the face.244 
The attending physician at the emergency room opined that the victim suffered mul-
tiple impacts to the head.245 After the victim died, the cause of death was determined 
to be a skull fracture from blunt force trauma.246 The victim had a laceration on the 
back of the head, but the pathologist “did not believe the laceration . . . and the skull 
fracture were caused by the same event.”247 He also stated that the injury probably 
did not come from a fall, but that it was “conceivable” that it did.248 A defense expert 
opined that the injury could have been caused by an unbroken fall from a standing 
position, but also that it was consistent with “intentionally slamming” the head into 
the curb.249 This is an arguably inadvertent killing. First, it is unclear whether the 
fatal head injury was caused by the defendant at all. But even assuming the worst 
version of the facts—that the defendant grabbed the victim and slammed her into the 
pavement—Miranda-Guerrero may not have adverted to death when he engaged in 
this conduct. Forcefully pushing a body into a hard surface (imagine if it were a wall 
instead) is not normally a deadly act. 
ii. Fire and Firearms 
In a second category of cases, we address the use of instrumentalities that are 
inherently deadly, but which can be set upon a victim accidentally: fires and firearms. 
Here, diminished culpability with respect to death will not be evident from the means 
of killing but must be established by testimony from the defendant witnesses, or from 
circumstances surrounding the instrumentality’s use. Consider the below cases. 
Jonathan Binney was sentenced to death by a South Carolina jury in 2002 for a 
shooting.250 Binney was facing a long prison term for a charge of child molestation, 
and in his despair, he purchased a gun. He then staked out a neighbor’s house and 
waited outside with the intent “to commit suicide or rape someone, or to just shoot 
all of them and kill [himself].”251 When the victim returned home, she startled 
                                                                                                             
 
 240. Id. at 1105. 
 241. People v. Miranda-Guerrero, 2014 WL 3378902, No. S118147, at *1 (Cal. June 10, 2014). 
 242. Id. at *13. 
 243. Id. at *94. 
 244. Id. at *5–*6. 
 245. Id. at *94. 
 246. Id. at *45. 
 247. Id. at *7. 
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 249. Id. at *15. 
 250. State v. Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418, 419 (S.C. 2005). 
 251. Id. at 420. 
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Binney, who in response “fired the gun in her direction and then chased her out of 
the house.”252 “Once outside, he shot in her direction again to ‘keep her scared and 
running,’” according to his confession, and then he ran away not knowing what hap-
pened.253 She was hit and died.254 While in jail, Binney was suicidal and repeatedly 
asked for the death penalty because his crime “warrant[ed] it.”255 This is arguably an 
inadvertent killing. While he admitted that he had considered entering the house to 
commit a murder, he stated that his shot was fired to “scare” the victim. Binney had 
no reason to lie about this, as he was actively seeking his own execution, and he did 
seem remorseful based on his statements.  
Julius Jones was sentenced to death by an Oklahoma jury in 2002 for a shoot-
ing.256 Jones killed the victim during a carjacking, shooting twice, with one bullet 
entering the head of the victim.257 These facts seem to be evidence of intentionality 
with respect to the killing, yet a cooperating witness testified that Jones told him 
immediately after the event that the “gun had discharged accidentally . . . .”258 
Moreover, Jones testified that their original plan was to merely steal the victim’s 
car.259 Jones had little motive to lie to his co-felon at the time that he made the claim 
of inadvertence, and the co-felon had no incentive to falsely diminish Jones’s culpa-
bility. For these reasons, this is arguably an inadvertent killing. While the gun was 
clearly pointed at the head of the victim, it may have fired accidentally.  
Paul Watkins was sentenced to death by a California jury in 1992 for a shoot-
ing.260 Watkins and a co-felon were casing a convenience store in anticipation of a 
robbery, and to blend in they raised their hoods and feigned having vehicle prob-
lems.261 When the victim approached to offer assistance, they told him to leave, at 
which point he walked away rapidly, indicating to the defendant, as he testified, 
that “it was obvious that he knew something wasn’t right about us . . . .”262 The 
defendant then fired a single shot from a pistol, which hit the victim’s abdomen 
and caused his death.263 The defendant claimed that the gun fired accidentally when 
he attempted to close the door of the car while the gun was in his hand.264 The gun 
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 262. Id. at 372. 
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did have a “‘heavy’ trigger pull,”265 making accidental discharge somewhat less 
likely, but a single gunshot could be inadvertent or an attempt to frighten a witness 
away, rather than an attempt to wound or kill.  
Raymond Oyler was sentenced to death by a California jury in 2009 for starting 
a wildfire that eventually killed five firefighters.266 Judicial findings of fact are 
limited in this case, which has not yet been reviewed by the California Supreme 
Court.267 However, even if we assume that the prosecution’s theory of the case was 
the one accepted by the jury—thus, viewing the facts most unfavorably towards 
the defendant—Oyler’s killings were arguably inadvertent. The prosecution argued 
that Oyler was a serial arsonist who had previously set a number of wild fires in 
the summer of 2006, and that in October 2006, he lit other fires, including the 
“Esperanza Fire” that killed the firefighters.268 However, the prosecution also 
introduced evidence regarding Oyler’s motives in October 2006: “Oyler planned 
to start a fire in the mountains where the Esperanza fire burned over Engine 57 in 
order to create a diversion so he could break his dog out of the Banning dog pound 
. . . .”269 Moreover, the defense did not challenge the credibility of testimony by a 
witness that shortly before the fire, Oyler “ranted about starting a fire near the [] 
dog pound to create a diversion so he could break his dog out . . . .”270 If this was 
the motive, then Oyler did not advert to the death of the firefighters. Surely the 
intended “distraction” of the fire would be that rescue personnel would flock to the 
scene of the fire, and possibly that the staff of the pound would be evacuated, but 
Oyler’s motives did not seem to include or contemplate the rescuers’ deaths. He 
had no “axe to grind” with the fire department, but instead wanted to use them in 
order to achieve another goal (the freeing of the dog). Curiously, though, Oyler’s 
girlfriend apparently paid to have the dog released the day before the fire started.271 
                                                                                                             
 
door closed with the back of his right hand—at which point the gun fired accidentally.”). 
 265. Id. at 371–72. 
 266. Appellant’s Opening Brief at *1, People v. Oyler, 2015 WL 10553050, No. S173784 
(Cal. 2015). 
 267. Id. The so-called “Esperanza Fire” occurred in 2006, and Oyler came to trial on mur-
der and arson charges in 2009. He was found guilty of arson and first-degree felony murder, 
with the special circumstance of murder in the course of arson. Id. at *6. In California, arson 
requires the willful and malicious burning of a structure, forest land, or property. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 451 (West 2010). Oyler was charged with and convicted of 451(c) wildland arson 
(“[a]rson of a structure or forest land”), as opposed to 451(b) (“arson that causes an inhabited 
structure to burn”). Id. Yet, the special circumstance charged and found in the case, CPC 
190.2(a)17(H) requires killing in the course of 451(b). CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2014). 
The standard instruction for the felony murder special circumstance CPC 190.2(a)17, 
CALCRIM 730 requires intent to commit the relevant felony, here 451(b). Id. The Court’s 
instruction, based on CALCRIM 1502, required only that defendant’s wildland arson burned 
an inhabited structure in fact. See Oyler, 2015 WL 10553050, at *6.  
 268. Oyler, 2015 WL 10553050, at *2. 
 269. Id. at *79. 
 270. Id.  
 271. Id. at *153. 
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iii. Analysis 
Having now discussed the facts of the currently pending death sentences for 
arguably inadvertent killings, we are able to assess the “unusualness” of this sen-
tencing practice. We have identified 15 such death sentences, and these sentences 
were given out in 7 jurisdictions.272 Florida, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and California 
accounted for 12 of the 15 sentences. Also, 12 of the 15 sentences were given be-
fore 2005. Recall, for comparison, the statistics on death sentencing practices that 
the Court has evaluated in the past: 
 
Case Punishment Practice Death Sentences 
Kennedy v. Louisiana,  
554 U.S. 407 (2008) Offense: child rape 
2 on death row, in one 
state 
Roper v. Simmons,  
543 U.S. 551 (2005) Offender: juvenile <18 
70 on death row  
(1973–2005) 
Atkins v. Virginia,  
536 U.S. 304 (2002) Offender: mentally disabled Not provided 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815 (1988) Offender: juvenile <16 5 (1982–1986) 
Ford v. Wainwright, 
 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) Offender: insane Not provided 
Enmund v. Florida, 
 458 U.S. 782 (1982) 
Offense: unintended 
vicarious felony murder 
3 on death row  
(1973–1982) 
Coker v. Georgia,  
433 U.S. 584 (1977) Offense: adult rape 5 (1973–1977) 
 
If only 15 potentially inadvertent killers are under sentence of death after 43 
years of modern capital sentencing, and in only 7 jurisdictions, this brings the prac-
tice within the ambit of being unconstitutionally rare. The number of death row 
inmates condemned for inadvertent killing is lower than the number condemned 
for killing as juveniles at the time of Roper. The 15 possibly inadvertent killers on 
death row are slightly more numerous than the 5 young adolescents considered in 
Thompson, the 3 vicarious unintentional felony murderers considered in Enmund, 
and the 5 inmates condemned for raping adults considered in Coker. However, 
when one considers the time period over which these sentences were given, this 
difference disappears. The 15 sentences we have identified include all those issued 
over the past 43 years that are still pending.273 One of these sentences is 25 years 
                                                                                                             
 
 272. California (3); Oklahoma (2); South Carolina (1); Tennessee (1); Arizona (1); Florida 
(2); Mississippi (3). This number would be reduced to 14 if we were to assess the numbers in 
light of the recent vacatur of Jeffrey Havard’s death sentence.  
 273. Current death row inmates include California inmate Douglas Stankewitz, sentenced 
in 1978. Ashleigh Panoo, California’s Longest-Serving Death Row Inmate Returns to Fresno 
Courtroom, FRESNO BEE (June 23, 2017), http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/crime 
/article157899009.html [https://perma.cc/KD2D-J8YQ]; see also People v. Stankewitz, 648 
P.2d 578 (Cal. 1982). 
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old.274 By contrast, Thompson’s and Coker’s 5 sentences each were issued in four-
year periods. Enmund’s three death sentences accumulated over only 8 years, from 
1973 to 1981. Significantly, only three arguably inadvertent felony murderers have 
been sentenced to death in the last 12 years. The Court in Enmund examined the 
cases of 739 of 796 death row inmates, of which 3 were accomplices without intent 
to kill. Thus, the sentencing practice challenged in Enmund was applied in only 
0.4% of the death row cases studied. The denominator in this calculation consists 
of death row inmates from all states, including 19 jurisdictions where Enmund 
could not have been executed. Dividing our 15 possibly inadvertent killers by the 
2863 death row inmates in all states as of 2016275 yields a very comparable rate of 
0.5% of that death row population. Even if we narrow the denominator to death 
row cases in states where execution of inadvertent felony murderers is permissible, 
the 15 cases that we identified are only 0.8% of these 1755 death row cases in the 
18 jurisdictions that permit execution of inadvertent felony murderers. In conclu-
sion, the rarity of death sentences for inadvertent killers is comparable to that of past 
sentencing practices deemed to be cruel and unusual by the Supreme Court.  
CONCLUSION 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has forbidden the execution of accomplices in 
felony murder unless they acted with a culpable mental state of at least reckless in-
difference to human life. Such execution was deemed “cruel” in violating the per-
missible purposes of capital punishment and “unusual” in violating evolving stand-
ards of decency as reflected in patterns of legislation, sentencing, and execution.  
Yet, the United States Supreme Court has not conditioned the execution of an 
actual killer on any culpable mental state. This effectively permits the execution of 
one who kills inadvertently—accidentally or negligently—in the course of a felony.  
In a previous article, we demonstrated that such executions, like executions of 
inadvertent accomplices in felony murder, fail to rationally advance the constitution-
ally permissible purposes of capital punishment, deterrence, and retribution. These 
purposes preclude the selection of any but the most culpable of killers for execution. 
Executing inadvertent felony murderers, like executing inadvertent accomplices in 
felony murder, is pointlessly “cruel.”  
In this Article, we have argued that execution of felony murderers who kill inad-
vertently is also “unusual” in violating community moral standards. Objective indi-
cia, as reflected in legislation, sentencing, and—most probatively—actual execu-
tions, demonstrate a nationwide consensus against capital punishment of inadvertent 
killers. Thirty-five jurisdictions forbid such sentences. Of the remaining 18 jurisdic-
                                                                                                             
 
 274. See People v. Watkins, 290 P.3d 364, 370 (Cal. 2012). 
 275. Death-Row Prisoners by State and Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR. (July 1, 2017), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-
row-year [https://perma.cc/Q3WS-5KY3]. Again, given this cutoff date, the vacatur of Jeffrey 
Havard’s death sentence is not incorporated in our data. This would bring the percentage of 
this sentencing practice out of all death row inmates down, though, and therefore only 
strengthens our argument. 
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tions, 11 have no inadvertent killers under a death sentence. Only three jurisdic-
tions—California, Mississippi, and Tennessee—have sentenced an arguably inad-
vertent killer to death in the last twelve years.  
Most significantly, of the 18 states permitting execution of inadvertent killers, 14 
have not executed a single inadvertent killer since Furman. Thus only 4 of our 53 
jurisdictions—California, Georgia, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—have executed 
an arguably inadvertent killer since Furman, and in only five cases. Even those states 
executing inadvertent killers have done so very infrequently. Only Georgia and 
Oklahoma have executed an arguably inadvertent killer in the last twelve years.  
Even where legally permitted, condemnation and execution of inadvertent killers 
has been and is now truly unusual. Accordingly, a new Eighth Amendment standard 
of decency should be recognized, and the capital punishment of inadvertent killing 
should be declared unconstitutional. 
 
* * * 
APPENDIX A: FELONY MURDER EXECUTIONS 
Shooting 
Arizona 
State v. Ceja, 612 P.2d 491 (Ariz. 1980);  
State v. Chaney, 686 P.2d 1265 (Ariz. 1984); 
State v. Comer, 799 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1990);  
State v. Greenawalt, 624 P.2d 828 (Ariz. 1981);  
State v. Gretzler, 612 P.2d 1023 (Ariz. 1980); 
State v. Harding, 670 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1983); 
State v. Jones, 4 P.3d 345 (Ariz. 2000); 
State v. Kemp, 912 P.2d 1281 (Ariz. 1996); 
State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1994). 
 
California 
Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000);  
Williams v. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 979 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  
 
Colorado 
People v. Davis, 849 P.2d 857 (Colo. App. 1992).  
 
Florida 
Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1997); 
Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1988); 
Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2002);  
Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1979); 
Daugherty v. State, 419 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1982); 
Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1981); 
Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2006);  
Ferguson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 580 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Francois v. State, 407 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1981); 
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Gore v. Dugger, 763 F. Supp. 1110 (M.D. Fla. 1989); 
Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988); 
Hamblen v. Dugger, 719 F. Supp. 1051 (M.D. Fla. 1989); 
Hendrix v. State, 637 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1994);  
Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1996); 
Hill v. Moore, 175 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1999); 
Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1983);  
Kennedy v. State, 455 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1984); 
Kormondy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 688 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012);  
Mills v. State, 462 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1985); 
Raulerson v. State, 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1978);  
Remeta v. State, 522 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1988); 
Robinson v. State, 574 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1991); 
Shriner v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Sims v. State, 444 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1983); 
Sullivan v. Wainwright, 695 F.2d 1306 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Thomas v. State, 374 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1979); 
Van Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347 (Fla. 2013); 
Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1982); 
White v. State, 446 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1984); 
Wuornos v. State, 676 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1995).  
 
Georgia 
Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2001); 
In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010); 
Ingram v. State, 323 S.E.2d 801 (Ga. 1984); 
Lynd v. Terry, 470 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Martinez High v. Turpin, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 1998);  
McClain v. Hall, 552 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2008); 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987);  
Mincey v. State, 304 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. 1983); 
Mitchell v. State, 214 S.E.2d 900 (Ga. 1975); 
Mobley v. Head, 306 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 2002); 
 Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Stanley v. State, 241 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 1977). 
 
Indiana 
Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994);  
Burris v. State, 465 N.E.2d 171 (Ind. 1984);  
Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. 1987);  
Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. 1990);  
Lowery v. State, 478 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. 1985);  
Wallace v. State, 486 N.E.2d 445 (Ind. 1985).  
 
Mississippi 
Brawner v. State, 947 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 2006);  
Edwards v. State, 413 So. 2d 1007 (Miss. 1982); 
Gray v. State, 728 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 1998);  
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Stevens v. State, 806 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 2001);  
Turner v. State, 732 So. 2d 937 (Miss. 1999);  
Woodward v. State, 726 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1997).  
 
North Carolina 
State v. Brown, 584 S.E.2d 278 (N.C. 2003);  
State v. Gardner, 319 S.E.2d 591 (N.C. 1984);  
State v. Hutchins, 279 S.E.2d 788 (N.C. 1981);  
State v. Lawson, 314 S.E.2d 493 (N.C. 1984);  
State v. Lyons, 468 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. 1996);  
State v. Roache, 595 S.E.2d 381 (N.C. 2004). 
 
Nevada 
Abeyta v. State, 944 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1997). 
 
Oklahoma  
Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2012);  
Braun v. State, 909 P.2d 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995);  
Brecheen v. State, 732 P.2d 889 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987);  
Carter v. State, 879 P.2d 1234 (Okla. Crim App. 1994);  
Coleman v. State, 668 P.2d 1126 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983);  
Fields v. State, 923 P.2d 624 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996);  
Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997);  
Hale v. State, 750 P.2d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988);  
Hamilton v. State, 937 P.2d 1001 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997);  
Knighton v. State, 912 P.2d 878 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996);  
Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Matthews v. State, 45 P.3d 907 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002);  
McCracken v. State, 887 P.2d 323 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);  
Moore v. State, 736 P.2d 161 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987);  
Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);  
Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982);  
Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984);  
Stafford v. State, 832 P.2d 20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992);  
 Wackerly v. State, 12 P.3d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
 
South Carolina  
Humphries v. State, 570 S.E.2d 160 (S.C. 2002);  
State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 1982);  
State v. Drayton, 361 S.E.2d 329 (S.C. 1987);  
State v. Gardner, 505 S.E.2d 338 (S.C. 1998); 
State v. Gilbert, 283 S.E.2d 179 (S.C. 1981);  
State v. Green, 392 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 1990);  
State v. Hill, 604 S.E.2d 696 (S.C. 2004);  
State v. Johnson, 410 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 1991);  
State v. Lucas, 328 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 1985);  
State v. Matthews, 353 S.E.2d 444 (S.C. 1986);  
State v. McWee, 472 S.E.2d 235 (S.C. 1996);  
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State v. Rocheville, 425 S.E.2d 32 (S.C. 1993);  
State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 1979) (Joseph Carl Shaw); 
State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 1979) (James Terry Roach); 
State v. Shuler, 545 S.E.2d 805 (S.C. 2001);  
State v. Truesdale, 328 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1984);  
State v. Tucker, 512 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1999);  
State v. Wise, 596 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 2004);  
State v. Woomer, 277 S.E.2d 696 (S.C. 1981).  
 
Blade 
Arizona 
State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1995);  
State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1987);  
State v. Lopez, 786 P.2d 959 (Ariz. 1990);  
State v. Mata, 609 P.2d 48 (Ariz. 1980);  
State v. Woratzeck, 657 P.2d 865 (Ariz. 1982).  
 
California 
Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 589 (C.D. Cal. 1992).  
 
Florida 
Bolin v. State, 117 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2013);  
Bottoson v. State, 443 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1983);  
Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994);  
Correll v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2013);  
Funchess v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 683 (11th Cir. 1985);  
King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1980);  
Mann v. State, 603 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1992);  
Martin v. State, 420 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1982);  
Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1990);  
Palmes v. State, 397 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1981);  
Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997);  
Stano v. State, 460 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1984);  
Straight v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1985).  
 
Georgia 
Brown v. State, 683 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. 2009); 
 Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1987);  
Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1985).  
 
Indiana 
Woods v. State, 547 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. 1989). 
Mississippi 
Burns v. State, 729 So. 2d 203 (Miss. 1998);  
Holland v. State, 587 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1991);  
Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1996);  
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Puckett v. Epps, 615 F. Supp. 2d 494 (S.D. Miss. 2009);  
Wilcher v. State, 635 So. 2d 789 (Miss. 1993); 
Williams v. Puckett, No. 1:97CV320LN, 2000 WL 35782463 (S.D. Miss. July 
20, 2000). 
 
North Carolina 
State v. McDougall, 301 S.E.2d 308 (N.C. 1983).  
 
Oklahoma 
Castro v. State, 745 P.2d 394 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987);  
DeRosa v. State, 89 P.3d 1124 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004);  
Foster v. State, 714 P.2d 1031 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986);  
Roberts v. State, 868 P.2d 712 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);  
Rogers v. State, 890 P.2d 959 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).  
 
South Carolina 
State v. Byram, 485 S.E.2d 360 (S.C. 1997); 
State v. Elkins, 436 S.E.2d 178 (S.C. 1993);  
State v. Gilbert, 283 S.E.2d 179 (S.C. 1981) (Gleaton, co-defendant);  
State v. Kornahrens, 350 S.E.2d 180 (S.C. 1986);  
State v. Torrence, 473 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1996).  
Bludgeoning 
Arizona 
State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993);  
State v. Gillies, 662 P.2d 1007 (Ariz. 1983);  
State v. West, 862 P.2d 192 (Ariz. 1993).  
 
Florida 
Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1976);  
Atkins v. State, 497 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1986);  
Bolender v. State, 422 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1982);  
Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985);  
Kimbrough v. State, 700 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1997);  
Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2006);  
Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1982). 
 
Georgia 
Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1985); 
 Tucker v. Francis, 723 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1984).  
 
Idaho 
State v. Wells, 864 P.2d 1123 (Idaho 1993).  
 
Indiana 
Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. 1992).  
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Mississippi 
Bishop v. State, 812 So. 2d 934 (Miss. 2002).  
North Carolina 
State v. Green, 443 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. 1994);  
State v. Powell, 459 S.E.2d 219 (N.C. 1995).  
 
Oklahoma 
Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802 (Okla Crim. App. 1993);  
Trice v. State, 853 P.2d 203 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993);  
Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986);  
Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 
South Dakota  
State v. Page, 709 N.W.2d 739 (S.D. 2006). 
Strangling 
Arizona 
State v. Landrigan, 859 P.2d 111 (Ariz. 1993);  
State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366 (Ariz. 1981);  
State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1996).  
 
Florida 
Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990);  
Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008);  
Marek v. State, 492 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1986);  
Carroll v. State, 636 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 1994);  
Gore v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 492 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2007);  
Happ v. Moore, 784 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2001);  
Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1997). 
 
Georgia 
Crawford v. State, 362 S.E.2d 201 (Ga. 1987); 
Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445 (11th Cir. 1993);  
Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1995);  
Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 2001).  
 
Nebraska 
State v. Otey, 464 N.W.2d 352 (Neb. 1979). 
 
Nevada  
Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002). 
 
North Carolina  
State v. Richmond, 495 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1998).  
 
Oklahoma 
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Duty v. Workman, 366 F. App’x 863 (10th Cir. 2010).  
 
South Carolina 
Arnold v. State, 420 S.E.2d 834 (S.C. 1992);  
State v. Adams, 306 S.E.2d 208 (S.C. 1983);  
State v. Downs, 604 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 2004); 
State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d 619 (S.C. 1984). 
 
Other 
Arizona 
State v. Gerlaugh, 698 P.2d 694 (Ariz. 1985).  
 
Florida  
Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1997);  
Waterhouse v. State, 429 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1983);  
Henry v. State, 613 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1992). 
 
Oklahoma 
Hawkins v. State, 891 P.2d 586 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);  
Short v. State, 980 P.2d 1081 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999). 
Suffocation 
Arizona 
State v. Villafuerte, 690 P.2d 42 (Ariz. 1984). 
 
Florida 
Henry v. Wainwright, 721 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Schwab v. State, 636 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1994). 
 
Indiana 
Benefiel v. State, 716 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. 1999).  
 
Oklahoma 
Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); 
Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 
 
South Carolina 
State v. Bell, 393 S.E.2d 364 (S.C. 1990);  
State v. Howard, 369 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. 1988);  
State v. Middleton, 368 S.E.2d 457 (S.C. 1988). 
Weaponless Beatings 
California 
People v. Babbitt, 755 P.2d 253 (Cal. 1988) (inadvertent and weaponless).  
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Florida 
Berry v. State, 703 So. 2d 269 (weaponless but intentional). 
 
Georgia 
   Blankenship v. Terry, No. 405CV194, 2007 WL 4404972 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 13,   
   2007);  
Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1984).  
 
North Carolina 
State v. Chandler, 467 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1996).  
 
Oklahoma 
Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008); 
Malicoat v. Mullin, 426 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2005);  
Warner v. Workman, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (W.D. Okla. 2011);  
Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 
APPENDIX B: FELONY MURDER DEATH SENTENCES 
Shootings 
Arizona 
State v. Boggs, 185 P.3d 111 (Ariz. 2008);  
State v. Burns, 344 P.3d 303 (Ariz. 2015);  
State v. Carlson, 351 P.3d 1079 (Ariz. 2015);  
State v. Fitzgerald, 303 P.3d 519 (Ariz. 2013);  
State v. Forde, 315 P.3d 1200 (Ariz. 2014);  
State v. Gallardo, 242 P.3d 159 (Ariz. 2010);  
State v. Garza, 163 P.3d 1006 (Ariz. 2007);  
State v. Goudeau, 372 P.3d 945 (Ariz. 2016);  
State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22 (Ariz. 1991);  
State v. Guarino, 362 P.3d 484 (Ariz. 2015);  
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